The beaches of the island of Phuket off the northwestern coast of Thailand are often flooded with Western tourists eager for exotic experiences. And yet, the same tropical sunshine that gives these beachgoers their characteristically golden tans also shines upon the tumultuous Thai provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. These southernmost provinces, all approximately 400 miles away from the tourist hotbed of Phuket, are home to the bloodiest, but most underreported sectarian violence in the region. Indeed, the Council on Foreign Relations deemed the area the “deadliest warzone in East Asia.”
Here, in the broiling heat of southern Thailand, an appallingly violent insurgency and an astoundingly unrestricted military have found themselves locked in constant conflict for the past nine years. The insurgents are almost all Muslim separatists, whose movement over the years has become more and more characterized by jihadi principles and terroristic strategies. The national military, which has been under martial law since the early 2000s, punishes the rebels indiscriminately, often engaging in extrajudicial killings and torture practices. Two weeks ago, however, the Thai federal government in Bangkok agreed to enter into negotiation with Hassan Taib, identified in press accounts as a senior rebel leader. The government and the rebel coalition will meet in Malaysia, which has adopted a role as peacemaker in the East Asian region, having hosted similar peace talks with the Philippines and Indonesia in the past.
While admittedly a promising step in the right direction, the negotiations seem to be too little, too late in light of the years of violence that have shaken Thailand’s infrastructure. Much disagreement exists on the exact cause or origin of the insurgency, and even less consensus has been reached with respect to the aggressors’ objectives.
General violence in the three Muslim dominated provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat dates as far back as the 1960s and began, according to the Asia Sentinel, with the “primary aim and legitimizing philosophy” of “the desire for national autonomy” for the primarily Muslim region. The area, which lies along the Malay border, used to be a self-contained sultanate until it was overrun and overpowered by the Buddhist monarchy of Thailand in the early part of the 1900s. Protests and calls for independence followed, culminating in a full-scale insurgency in the ’60s and ’70s. Thus, the conflict was initially motivated by nationalism rather than religion.
This first wave of violence died down, however, and did not resume for a number of years. The exact year of its resurgence is unclear. Newsweek claims “the roots of today’s strife stretch back to 2000,” with the administration of then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Describing Thaksin as an impassioned populist, the article depicts the politician as fixated on lowering wealth disparity; he allegedly succeeded in this goal through the implementation of various initiatives such as almost fully subsidized health care for a majority of the population and revitalized village infrastructure.
This focus on the poorer populations of Thailand’s citizenry angered some of the nation’s classic political elite, including the monarchy, the military, and corporate bosses, all of whom contributed to a coup in 2006, in which Thaksin was forced to relinquish his position as PM. Newsweek characterizes resulting violence as a conflict between supporters of Thaksin, coalescing under the title “United Front for Democracy,” and an opposing, antigovernment organization called the People’s Alliance for Democracy.
Still another account of the divisive politics in the south comes from the Council on Foreign Relations which claims that “the war began in earnest in 2001,” the year in which “an unknown entity organised five well-coordinated attacks on police stations in the south, killing five officers.” The Council attributes the attacks to “simmering separatist tensions” in the southern region of Thailand caused by an aloof government and a strong Muslim identity that manifested itself in the form of private Islamic pondok schools.
Whatever its cause, be it political or religious, the violence of today is decentralized, erratic, and, as such, completely unpredictable. Many fear that this lack of central organization or cohesion will make the situation impossible to control or halt. The past few years have seen some of the worst violence in the country, and, indeed, the world. In fact the Global Terrorism Index ranked Thailand number eight in the list of countries suffering the most from the impact of terrorism. Over 5,000 people have been killed since the turn of the century. And the violence has taken on incredibly grotesque forms with rebels infiltrating schools and shooting teachers in front of young children and military members engaging in horrifying methods of torture and killings in an attempt to subdue the separatists.
Solving this problem will inevitably be a long and complicated process. The International Crisis Group laid out a plan for both sides of the conflict, emphasizing that Bangkok ought to prioritize the issue in its policymaking, adopt a more representative and decentralized form of government, and put an end to the martial law that has allowed for the innumerable human rights abuses to take place.
Ultimately, the Thai civil war is rooted in severe miscommunication and disregard for basic human rights. In order for the peace talks to succeed, both sides of the conflict must be forthright; honest communication and straightforward negotiation seem to be a fair price to pay to halt the bloodshed that has for so long consumed this nation.
Photo Credit: The Guardian
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