While working in Hong Kong over the past summer, I took the same route back from my office everyday except one. On July 1, I reached Hennessy Road and was met with the sight of thousands marching for democracy. As the anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong from the British to the Chinese, July 1 has since been a day of activism for Hong Kongers, but this most recent march took on special significance in the context of the infamous white paper that outlined Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the island. Following the demonstration through the areas of Wan Chai, Admiralty, and into Central, I witnessed firsthand the sort of idealistic, liberal aspirations of Hong Kong’s generation Y that I had found suppressed during my travels in mainland China.
Walking to my office the next morning, however, it felt as if nothing had happened. A few arrests had been made in Central, but otherwise a remarkable sense of calm pervaded the streets that mere hours ago had been lined with tense policeman and overflowing with eager supporters. Hong Kong was once again the image of order, productivity, and efficiency. Nothing, it seemed, had changed.
The pro-democracy “Umbrella Revolution” that has been active since September 22 hopes to break from this precedent. Three primary groups—the Hong Kong Federation of Students, Scholarism, and Occupy Central—have captured the attention of media across the globe in their demonstrations against the Chinese government’s filtering of candidates for elections of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. Where Western sources have been largely sympathetic, mainland outlets have been decisively opposed. In either case, however, fundamental biases have simplified the debate and crowded out more thorough analyses of what is best for Hong Kong.
Trouble Within
The debate in Hong Kong is not one that can be reduced to Hong Kong versus Beijing. A recent Economist cover page ran the headline “The Party v the people,” but the reality is far more complicated. In fact, the debate is less between Hong Kong and the mainland than it is between different groups within Hong Kong itself. The attention that student activists have recently garnered has made them appear disproportionately representative of Hong Kong as a whole. Public opinion is decisively mixed. After a popular poll this past summer in support of the Occupy movement garnered 800,000 signatures, an anti-Occupy poll managed to reach 1.3 million signatures (though some question its legitimacy). The most recent poll by the Chinese University of Hong Kong shows 37.8 percent of respondents in support of the Occupy Movement, 35.5 percent against, and 23.2 percent undecided.
In an HPR interview, Jeffrey Ngo explained his experience as a Hong Kong native who has been in touch with activists in Hong Kong and who has been organizing support for the protests in the United States. Ngo described the age gap of the protests as stemming from two primary sources. Firstly, in practical terms, the fact that most adults have full-time responsibilities such as work and family has excluded them from the non-stop occupations and protests that the students have engaged in. Although that does not necessarily exclude them from supporting the efforts, it does mean that the face of the protests is unquestionably Hong Kong’s youth.
Middle-aged and elderly citizens are generally far less disposed to support the protests than their younger counterparts. As Ngo noted, “If you are a businessman and already have a car or an apartment, you are far less likely to call for change because you identify with the status quo.” The average adult Hong Konger is unlikely to risk the value of their home or the steady job they have at, say, a Chinese corporation in pursuit of true democracy. The status quo remains in their interest. In contrast, Ngo described what Hong Kong’s younger generation sees as a situation that provides them few opportunities for their futures. Jobs, cars, and apartments are only getting more expensive. In the past five years alone, the average price of a house in Hong Kong has surged 84.2 percent, all while people “already work their entire lives just to get a small apartment.” To some, therefore, change is welcome. It is hardly surprising that 62.1 percent of the respondents to the Chinese University poll age 15-24 supported the Occupy Movement, compared to 28.4 percent of respondents age 40-59.
This dichotomy is perhaps best illustrated by the stark contrast between C. Y. Leung, Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing incumbent Chief Executive, and eighteen-year-old Joshua Wong, leader of the student group Scholarism. They represent two poles of the current debate: on the one side, there is Hong Kong’s political and business elite, and on the other stands its idealistic, outward-looking younger generation. The past few weeks have only exacerbated tensions and mistrust between the two, but they have also created an important opportunity for compromise and genuine discourse. After the miscalculated use of tear gas and pepper spray on protestors that further damaged the government’s image, police have been far more restrained, following Leung’s lead in waiting out the protests without inflaming the situation further. This is no Tiananmen—the People’s Liberation Army is not about to descend on Central. Neither side wants to aggravate existing tensions between Hong Kongers and mainlanders, which have already erupted in isolated incidents in Mong Kok, where mainland Chinese compose large portions of the community.
A “Harmonious” Union?
At the heart of this diversity of perspective are Hong Kong’s fundamental ties to the mainland, which have long been a source of debate. The relationship between Hong Kong and China is perhaps one of the most mutually beneficial of its kind in the world, but it also compromises the bargaining position of the protestors. Hong Kong’s dependence on China cannot be overstated. Its status as an access point to China for international investors and to international markets for mainlanders has endowed it with a robust financial services industry and enormous amounts of cash and capital. The reliance extends well beyond finance, however. In 2013, 75 percent of Hong Kong’s fifty-four million tourists were Chinese, contributing the lion’s share of the HK$343.1 billion in tourism revenue for the year. Rich mainland consumers have attracted the world’s top retail brands, and nearly 40 percent of Hong Kong’s 2013 foreign direct investment came from China. Upwards of 90 percent of Hong Kong’s meats and vegetables and about 70 percent of its water supply is sourced from the mainland.
Nonetheless, Hong Kong is arguably as indispensible to China as China is to Hong Kong. In an interview with the HPR, Tom Holland, a research editor at the Hong Kong-based financial research firm Gavekal, described the economics at play in the current debate. Holland outlined “free capital flows, freedom of information, the rule of law, credible institutions, transparent regulation, and the depth of its know-how” as qualities that make Hong Kong the financial powerhouse it is, adding that mainland cities like Shanghai “don’t come close.” Beyond its exceptionalism in this regard, Holland also stressed Hong Kong’s unique ability to achieve Beijing’s two primary financial objectives: “keeping a grip on capital flows and promoting the RMB [Renminbi, the currency system which uses yen] as a trade currency.” These two mutually exclusive goals require an “offshore financial center with a pool of yuan liquidity that foreigners trust, but that ultimately Beijing can control.” Thus, despite speculation that cities like Shanghai or Shenzhen may soon replace it, Hong Kong will remain instrumental in mainland China’s growth for decades to come.
Looking Forward
All this raises the stakes of the pro-democracy demonstrations but also makes their success less likely. There is too much at play for Hong Kong’s elite, not to mention China as a whole, to ever risk letting Hong Kong slip out Beijing’s firm grasp. Although this effectively rules out the democratic nomination of candidates that protestors have been clamoring for, it does leave room for certain concessions. Stability has always been a priority for Xi Jinping’s Communist Party, and the continued occupation of Hong Kong’s streets presents the risk of igniting domestic powder kegs in Tibet and Xinjiang, two areas where Chinese control has been met with even more indignation.
So although C. Y. Leung has demonstrated a willingness to wait out the protests, officials in Hong Kong and Beijing are seeking ways to bring the ordeal to a swifter conclusion. Minor concessions have already been offered, including sending Beijing a report on the status of the protests and making changes to the candidate selection committee, but both have been rejected by activists struggling to coordinate on strategy.
Now more than a month into the protests, the priority for the three activist groups should be to overcome their lack of unity in order to pry meaningful concessions from the government as soon as possible. They cannot afford to let their bargaining position erode further, as popular opposition mounts to the continued disruption of life in Hong Kong. A hardline pursuit of full-fledged democracy will ultimately be a losing battle. Given the diversity of political opinion within Hong Kong, compromise stands as the most logical outcome—one that will ensure that protestor’s efforts will not have been in vain while allowing Beijing to save face through a firm stance against removing the screening committee. Through compromise, a better Hong Kong can emerge from the trials of the past weeks.
Related coverage: To access an October 1 interview of Hong Kong resident and student activist Heather Pickerell, conducted by the HPR as part of the organization’s radio program on WHRB 95.3, click here.
Image source: Pasu Au Yeung, Flickr.com
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