Israel’s constant existential vulnerability, as Prime Minister Netanyahu never tires of saying, is unique among nations. Apart from the United States, Israel has few, if any, close allies, and most of the nations surrounding it have vowed its destruction. Just 1000 miles away lies Iran, which has not only has sworn to destroy Israel, but is actively developing nuclear weapons—hardly a reassuring combination. It is no wonder that Mr. Netanyahu constantly worries for his country. As if that were not enough, the prime minister is worried for himself; he is a very unpopular, very divisive leader up for re-election in less than two weeks. These problems, none of which mix well, have driven Mr. Netanyahu into a perfect storm of bad decisions that have backfired on his country’s foreign policy.
Most recently, the Prime Minister’s highly controversial speech to the U.S. Congress has created a firestorm in Israeli politics. Surveys show that Israeli voters see a poor relationship with the United States as equally—if not more—problematic as an Iranian nuclear weapon. The nebulous possibility of a trigger-happy President Rouhani with hypothetical access to a future bomb is not quite as immediate or as tangible as the billions of dollars of aid, international legitimacy, and routine UN Security Council vetoes that the American alliance confers.
Moreover, the promise of American assistance ultimately serves as the last line of defense for Israel. A mushroom cloud over Tel Aviv would most certainly trigger American action against Iran. Of course, even Mr. Netanyahu’s missteps are not likely to change this close, long-standing, and overwhelmingly bipartisan support overnight, but they do raise questions about just how close, just how long-standing, and just how bipartisan the relationship has been, will be, and should be.
Beyond his recent speech, Mr. Netanyahu has pursued additional alienating policies, especially his hardline approach to settlements and purported opposition to a two-state solution, forcing Israel into a diplomatic corner. By seeming unreasonable and unwilling to come to the negotiating table, he has ceded the perceived high ground and made anti-Israel sentiment more defensible.
This approach has relegated Mr. Netanyahu to peanut gallery rabblerousing, shut out of the real diplomacy that matters. The P5+1 negotiations in Geneva will help determine the future of the Iranian nuclear program in the near term, but they have notably bypassed Israel. As a result, the prime minister must instead resort to political stunts like his most recent speech to the U.S. Congress. He can decry any deals as much as he wants, but perhaps if he had pursued a more conciliatory foreign policy, he could have influenced the negotiations more directly.
Moving forward, it will be important for the Israeli electorate to consider whether a pragmatic leader or an ideologue will be better for their national interest. Of course, foreign affairs and national security are not their only concerns; many Israelis will no doubt have their pocketbooks on their mind when they go to the polls next week. Yet in a nation whose foreign policy does not merely deal with international peacemaking and free trade pacts but also the very nature of its survival, Mr. Netanyahu’s foreign policy choices have serious repercussions. Regardless of whether the incumbent Likud Party maintains its majority, Israelis should ask themselves whether their foreign policy is really on the right track, and if not, whether Mr. Netanyahu is the right person to lead Israel forward.
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