The United States’ nuclear deal with Iran, struck formally on July 11 of this year, represented a historic moment and potential turning point in U.S.-Iranian relations. In the immediate aftermath of the deal, supporters from within the United States and its Western allies heralded the deal as a victory for diplomacy and compromise over sanctions and military intervention. Although they have largely tempered their aspirations for the deal in negotiations with congressional Republicans, both President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have spoken of its potential to improve ethnic and political tensions in the Middle East and, in the long term, normalize Iran’s relations with the broader international community.
Within Iran, however, perspectives regarding the future of relations with the United States appear polarized, as supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani have expressed divergent attitudes towards normalized relations with the “Great Satan.” Khamenei, who holds ultimate say in all political decisions in Iran, has repeatedly emphasized continued animosity towards the United States. Yet a reformist faction, led by Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, has expanded its influence within the Iranian polity. A younger, more liberal generation is about to come of age. These forces—which seem to have even pulled Khamenei somewhat to the left—suggest the inevitability that the deal will strengthen, rather than further sever, diplomatic, economic, and commercial relations. This would in turn allow for pragmatism, instead of ideology, to situate itself as Iran’s model for governance.
Present vs. Past
The nuclear deal represented the culmination of a series of talks between the Obama Administration and President Rouhani since his election in August 2013. In the first press conference of his presidency, Rouhani asserted his intention to reorient and reenergize Iran’s international relations, improve its international standing, take measures to reverse the effects of debilitating sanctions, and ensure greater nuclear transparency to restore international trust. Rouhani’s speech at the 2013 General Assembly in New York—which laid the groundwork for a cautious and decisive new foreign policy—garnered praise from Western heads of state and represented a stark contrast to the hardline rhetoric of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
But even as Rouhani’s official rhetoric appeared to signal the rise of a more open, inclusive, and cooperative Iran, a conservative base still held significant traction within the country. Supreme Leader Khamenei, who has held the head of state position since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, remains an icon of revolutionary-era Islamic conservatism. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—founded to protect the country’s Islamic institutions in the aftermath of the Revolution—continues to wield substantial authority over all political and military matters, acting as a check on any overt (and many covert) threats to Iran’s governing sharia law. Under former President Ahmadinejad, the Revolutionary Guard expanded its social, political, military, and economic roles in country. Far from a vestige of revolutionary era politics, the Guard is perhaps the most influential institution in Iran, and its influence sustains itself on anti-Americanism. “With about 125,000 members, the Revolutionary Guard dominates Iran’s foreign affairs, national security, politics, and economy,” explained Steven K. O’Hern, a retired U.S. military counterintelligence officer, in his book regarding Iran-U.S. relations. “Since the 1979 Revolution, it has earned its reputation for unpredictable and violent action.”
The Revolutionary Guard, which answers directly to the Supreme Leader, has largely directed Iran’s foreign affairs, including its continued support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Rouhani’s commitment at the onset of his time in office to engaging diplomatically with the West regarding Iran’s nuclear program thus marked a role-reversal within Iranian politics.
A Polarized Climate
The nuclear deal appeared to deepen the fault lines within Iranian politics, as explicit tensions arose surrounding the degree to which the agreement ought to foster increased diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. “The aftermath of the nuclear deal has highlighted a key difference between the Rouhani-Zarif faction, which is looking towards greater compromise with the West and integrating Iran more within the international community, and the conservative faction that advocates confrontation and living on a resistance economy,” Harvard Kennedy School Professor Matthew Bunn told the HPR. “And I think the Rouhani-Zarif camp won a big victory, politically speaking, with the nuclear deal.”
Rouhani has repeatedly discussed the deal not only within the context of his country’s nuclear program, but also with regard to its potential to ease stress within U.S.-Iranian relations. “From our point of view, the agreed-upon deal is not the final objective but a development which can and should be the basis of further achievements to come,” remarked Mr. Rouhani at the UN General Assembly on September 28.
In contrast to Rouhani’s forward-looking, cooperative rhetoric, Khameni emphasized Iran’s continued suspicion the United States: “We have announced that we will not negotiate with the Americans on any issue other than the nuclear case…prepare for the continuation of the fight against America.” Hardline Revolutionary Guard members went further to describe Khamenei as a “revolutionary, not a diplomat.” Other commentators have cited his genuine distrust of the United States and belief that the nuclear deal represented a calculated tactic exclusively in Iran’s favor, a “one-off agreement” to have Iran’s sanctions lifted. And despite Rouhani’s willingness to engage more openly with the West, it is Khamenei who wields ultimate say in all of Iran’s foreign policy decisions.
This seemingly polarized political climate, in light of the historic multilateral nuclear deal, reveals the extent to which ideological extremes have driven Iranian politics since 1979. Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard’s monopoly on the political system has long sustained the influence of the 1979 revolution—and thus revolutionary rhetoric—on all decision-making. A closed off, heavily state-controlled economic system has represented a bastion of revolution-era policy, yet has often entailed more harm than good. This self-reliance-based policy led Iran to become increasingly dependent on oil revenue and a fluctuating energy market, and become mired in sanctions and lack of commercial ties.
At the same time, confrontation with the West, and the United States in particular, a rallying cry of the Revolution, became Iran’s defining political philosophy. This essentially prevented any serious international negotiation, as conservative hardliners expressed vocal opposition to any forms of diplomatic engagement. Until Rouhani’s election in 2013, a comparatively reformist faction had never wielded significant authority within Iran. The perspective offered by Rouhani and Zarif thus not only represents a more open Iran, but also a more liberal, outward-looking and practical policy-oriented Iran.
A successful nuclear deal is likely to tilt the political balance in favor of the reformists’ agenda. “As the nuclear pact is carried out and the sanctions are lifted, Iran’s favorite scapegoat can no longer plausibly be regarded as the root of all evil in the world,” concluded Thomas Erdbrink of the New York Times. Continued Bunn, “[the nuclear deal] greatly strengthens the political position of the forces of compromise and shows that it is actually possible to have a compromise with the West, which was not [previously] obvious to many in Iran, including the Supreme Leader.”
A Shifting Tide
Despite his inflammatory rhetoric and expressed commitment to enmity with the United States, a number of domestic and international analysts contend Khamenei may not be as opposed to open relations as he suggests. Many experts point to Khamenei’s willingness to engage the United States in nuclear talks, authorization of the nuclear deal, and even willingness to confirm Rouhani as President in 2013 as evidence of potentially shifting political tides within the conservative base itself. Bunn noted that analysts ought not necessarily “put Rouhani and the Supreme Leader at odds,” as Rouhani’s policy stance would be no more than talking points without Khamenei’s support.
It was also Khameni who drew the blueprints for the nuclear talks that eventually allowed for the 2015 nuclear deal, albeit more with the goal of lifting sanctions than improving diplomatic relations with the United States. Khameni authorized direct negotiations under the condition that Foreign Minister Zarif lead bargaining on behalf of Iran. He held meetings with the foreign minister to finalize a strict strategic agenda for the discussions. “In the end even the supreme leader wants to have better relations with America,” opined Farshad Ghorbanpour, a political analyst close to the Iranian government, to the New York Times.
This deeper, perhaps even tacit recognition on Khameni’s part of the benefit Iran draws from more open diplomacy suggests the nuclear deal will not only pacify rhetoric directed at the United States but also facilitate more open economic and political relations in the long run. Lifted sanctions will already lead to a series of short-run benefits, many of which go directly to the pockets of Iran’s most powerful individuals. Those benefits may be sufficient to sway even the staunchest of conservative ideologues, including and particularly the Supreme Leader himself.
A Young Iranian Vanguard
Perhaps most importantly, the Iran nuclear deal will likely galvanize young Iranians to refocus Iranian politics away from ideology and towards concrete, practical reforms aimed at development. Young Iranians, removed from the defining revolutionary ideology of their parents’ generation, largely do not associate the United States with the “Great Satan.” “We love Obama and your country,” declared an Iranian secondary school student when approached by The New York Times in a perspective strikingly at odds with rallying cries of the 1979 revolution. Yet another added: “America is very, very good.” Students perceived the United States as commercially and technologically thriving, indicating a hope that the Iranian government would strive to create a similar climate at home.
The Carnegie Endowment estimates that each year, some 1.2 million Iranian youths enter a jobs market that is unable to meet their needs. Unofficially, unemployment is estimated at over 50 percent for young people. Younger Iranians appear overwhelmingly to favor improving the socioeconomic outlook through, among other initiatives, opening commercial relations with the United States.
This overt openness and willingness to look beyond historic tensions from young Iranians suggests the nuclear deal is the first in what may be a series of endeavors to not only normalize, but actively strengthen relations with the United States. Although the Revolutionary Guard will continue to exert substantial influence over Iran’s political system for the foreseeable future, and any overall reforms will likely be gradual in nature, changing sentiments bode well for the continued success of a reformist diplomatic and economic agenda.
Image source: Wikimedia // U.S. Department of State // Визит в Исламскую Республику Иран
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