It has been less than three years since Mahsa Amini died in police custody after being arrested for not wearing her Hijab properly. Now, Iran has a president who openly criticized the Iranian government’s response to Amini and supported the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Still, for the Iranians who see through the regime’s progressive illusion, reform is not enough. Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency will simply be a new, slightly more moderate platform perpetuating the status quo.
The 2024 Iranian elections were conducted early after former President Raisi died in a helicopter crash on May 19, 2024. In accordance with the country’s procedures, the Guardian Council, a political extension of the Islamic Republic that oversees elections and ensures candidate alignment with Islamic ideals, vetted and narrowed the list of presidential candidates to five conservative candidates and Masoud Pezeshkian, a moderate reformist.
After no candidate received a majority of votes in the first round, which drew the lowest voter turnout since the 1979 revolution, Pezeshkian, who had earned 10.4 million votes, ran against conservative hardline candidate Saeed Jalili, who had won 9.4 million votes.
Pezeshkian and Jalili’s runoff election increased voter turnout from 40% in the original election to a reported 49.6%. Nonetheless, more than half of Iranian voters, believing no candidate would enact significant reform, chose to stay home on election day, with many protesting the Islamic Republic.
Although 16.3 million people voted for Pezeshkian, vaulting him to the presidency handily over Jalili’s 13.5 million votes, there were an additional 600,000 voided votes in which people cast empty ballots rather than choosing one of the candidates a clear indication of large-scale discontent with the current regime.
Importantly, although the president stands atop the executive branch, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, still wields the most political power. Thus, despite Pezeshkian’s apparent liberalism and pro-Western stances, many believe Pezeshkian’s reign will only further entrench an oppressive regime, rather than lead to the promised liberalization and globalization reforms.
Indeed, despite the seemingly radical divergence from his right-wing predecessor, Pezeshkian was selected by the Guardian Council, a body composed of six unelected clerics and six unelected jurists, all Khamenei loyalists. If the council believed Pezeshkian imposed an existential or ideological threat to the stability of the regime, they would not have chosen him.
Choosing Pezeshkian was a deliberate choice to legitimize a failing regime. Leading up to the election, intelligence officers told Khamenei that turnout would only be around 13% due to discontent around social reform stagnation and economic hardship.
Fearing the erosion of the clerical establishment’s credibility, Khamenei discussed ways to steer the election with his advisors, attempting to find a candidate that struck a balance between widespread appeal and an unwillingness to challenge Shi’ite theocracy.
Although Pezeshkian’s victory relied on urban, middle-class, and young voters frustrated with the Iranian police state and repressed freedoms, Pezeshkian had publicly promised not to oppose Iran’s clerical regime, making reform nearly impossible.
Thus, it was a tale of two stories for Iran’s disgruntled opposition to the current regime. In an interview with Reuters, one university student, Sepideh, in Tehran, exclaimed, “I will not vote. This is a big NO to the Islamic Republic because of Mahsa [Amini]. I want a free country, I want a free life.” Like Sepideh, many voters believed supporting any candidate handpicked by the Guardian Council would not bring the positive change they wanted to see.
Other voters were more pragmatic. One salon owner, Afarin, in Isfahan, stated in an interview with Reuters, “I did not vote last week but today I voted for Pezeshkian. I know Pezeshkian will be a lame duck president but still he is better than a hardliner.” Although enough voters, like Afarin, were willing to set aside their problems with the electoral system to vote for Pezeshkian, the people who refused to vote will loom large over his presidency.
Iran’s 2024 election was unprecedented across many axes. It came at the intersection of a tragic death, waves of domestic policy, and conflict in the Middle East.
In a contentious backdrop surrounding Iran’s path forward, despite his promise to adhere to Iran’s clerical regime. Pezeshkian will influence the selection of Khamenei’s successor and, therefore, the shape of Iran’s future.
Although it can seem Pezeshkian is merely a continuation of the status quo, incremental reforms can still change the lives of individual Iranians.
As someone who has always wanted to visit Iran and see the birthplace of my grandmother, I, like many in the Iranian diaspora, doubt that Pezeshkian’s election will make it safe for me to travel to the country with my grandma. However, hopefully, this election plants seeds of incremental reform and norm-setting that can create change. He could meaningfully improve the lives of millions of women by giving them more autonomy and limiting state repression.
I might not be able to go to Iran with my grandma, but this election may mean that I can eventually go with my grandkids.
Finance Director
