It is no secret that polarization is a major problem in current American politics. Constant attempts by political leaders to characterize the other side of the political spectrum as a threat to the country’s working order serve to handicap the ability to pass meaningful legislation, while widening the existing partisan divide. Painting members of opposing parties as morally corrupt and, at times, intentionally subversive amplifies a burgeoning distrust in governmental institutions that only deepens over time.
Since the era of the Civil Rights Movement, American citizens have increasingly aligned their party allegiances with their social views. A socially conservative Democrat or progressive Republican is a rare sight today, especially at a time when socializing with political opponents is challenging and nonpartisan outlets have a less prominent role in the media environment. Extreme polarization is a major issue. Currently, a record-high 80% of Americans believe that the country is “greatly divided” on the most important values, while appearing to be abandoning an understanding of the importance of cooperation in politics.
As the country realizes its need to reorient American politics to a true north, perhaps it is time to look to the geographic north for some comparative guidance. Are there any lessons for America to learn from Canada, which has seemingly avoided some of the more pernicious challenges of polarization? A deep dive reveals that Canada may offer some lessons, though perhaps just as cautionary as they are encouraging.
Is Canada the Right Role Model?
While political polarization also exists in Canada, it appears markedly less intense than that experienced in the U.S. It is true that in recent years, Canada’s multiparty system has shifted more and more toward the two-party model that has been victim to the political turmoil south of the border. It is true that many of its prominent political figures, such as Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre, have at times latched onto the divisive rhetoric popularized by America’s extremes. It is also true that significant regional differences abound in the oil-rich West and French-speaking Quebec, lately prompting renewed separatist sentiments. At its core, though, Canada’s history and governmental system more effectively manage polarization, with an abundance of lessons to share with its neighbors to the south.
Thanks to its cooperation-focused core values, Canada has largely been able to escape the extreme polarization that permeates American politics. Darrell Bricker, CEO of global research firm Ipsos Public Affairs, explained in an interview with the HPR that Canada’s confederation is notable in promoting compromise rather than division because “very diverse groups with very diverse interests had to take a glass half-full approach” to construct a thriving nation. Historically, the country has always been forced to reconcile its sizable and culturally distinct francophone population with dreams of a growing nation contingent on national unity. As such, supporting high levels of immigration in an embrace of diversity has long been an economic priority.
Moreover, because Canada operates under a multiparty parliamentary system, it inherently encounters less partisan polarization. Minority parties must buttress one another in order to pass a bill in a minority parliament, so compromise in the form of aisle-crossing is necessary. Meanwhile, according to Richard Johnston, professor emeritus of political science at the University of British Columbia, in an interview with the HPR, the American system “facilitates the expression of mainline sentiment in the party’s base,” so a rural Republican candidate has little incentive to advocate for cooperation lest he get “primaried.”
In Canada, however, Johnston explained that there exists a “stronger set of pressures on individual members of Parliament to toe the line” to prevent alienating their potential voters, as a parliamentary governmental structure means that nearly all decisions must include consideration from representatives nationwide. It also helps that many of the country’s most closely contested seats encompass culturally diverse suburbs, where engaging in polarizing us-versus-them rhetoric does not resonate as well with the majority of the populace.
An additional result of these structural differences is that Canadian politics is generally more civil than the hostile American Congress. As Anne Wilson, a social psychologist at Wilfrid Laurier University in Ontario, explained to the HPR, even the daily House of Commons Question Period for exchanging remarks primarily includes discourse about “actual political issues” rather than the demonization of opponents that often occurs in U.S. congressional sessions. Of course, the U.S. government is not parliamentary, and a fundamental overhaul of the nation’s political system is both ill-advised and wildly impractical. That said, perhaps Canada’s strategies to depolarize enough to overcome gridlock, such as encouraging dialogue through rules and standards of decorum in the legislative branch, can find parallels in American politics.
However, it is worth emphasizing that Canada is far from some cooperative utopia. Critics argue that Canada’s level of polarization, albeit less severe than in America, still inhibits meaningful cooperation. As Bricker describes, the country suffers from a severe urban-rural divide, in which intellectual, urban elites drive progressive issues such as ambitious climate policy that alienate the rest of the nation. Moreover, as Johnston explains, Quebec’s renewed separatist politics are “existential,” with no American equivalent. The product of a centuries-long cultural antipathy with the rest of Canada, Quebecois separatists have led two sovereignty referendums since 1980, and may lead a third in the coming years thanks to a likely Parti Québecois landslide in this fall’s provincial election in Quebec.
A multiparty system can only somewhat defuse cultural differences if a major geographic region continually threatens secession. With a fragmented media landscape, ideological and affective differences are only amplified, as social media algorithms reflect and broadcast extreme viewpoints. As Wilson explains, this leads to a detrimental “false polarization” in which citizens perceive members of opposing parties as holding more extreme views than the reality. And although Canada is technically a multiparty system, the last time it had a non-Liberal or Conservative governing party was 1921. In fact, some analysts claim that Canada suffers from a one-and-a-half-party rule, where Liberals’ tendency to occasionally behave less vigorously as the dominant party effectively requires Conservatives to behave in a similarly lenient manner when in power.
In even more of a convergence with the U.S., Canada’s parliamentary system similarly rewards the dominant parties for taking a regional view to campaigning that intentionally panders to certain areas of the country over others. Like swing states in America, the system rewards narrow-minded campaigns, contributing to a democratic deficit. For instance, the Liberals have won three consecutive minority governments with a plurality of the vote originating primarily from Ontario and Quebec. As is the case in the U.S., the de facto two-party system in Canada, structurally reinforced by electoral realities, clearly presents a roadblock to the goal of depolarizing politics.
Exploring Structural Solutions to Party Politics
If Canada and America are both essentially entrenched in a two-party gridlock, could a third political party be the solution? While an optimistic idea, it will never emerge spontaneously, says Eric Merkley, assistant professor of political science at University of Toronto and author of “Polarization, Eh? The Causes and Consequences of Affective Polarization in Canada,” in an interview with the HPR. Indeed, as York University professor of sociology Cary Wu explains to the HPR, “it’s so polarized in the U.S. that a third party is almost impossible, because people are so attached to two different parties that there’s no room for a third.” Johnston emphasizes that in America’s winner-take-all presidential electoral system, the two parties “have so completely colonized all the paraconstitutional parts of the system,” meaning both parties would fear the emergence of a third that could split the vote and play spoiler.
If a third party is not feasible, how then can governments work to reduce polarization? Merkley suggests changing campaign finance laws to directly alter politicians’ incentives. In a system where political campaigns are costly, donors have extraordinary power in the success and platform of a candidate. Still, what would drive a governing party to willingly limit future donations in the name of depolarization? Indeed, Johnston is “very pessimistic” that America can depolarize at all. For him, the solution requires moderate Republicans in suburban regions to face down divisive MAGA candidates in the name of the party’s electoral interest. Instead of detracting from the poles, parties should look to empower the center. Still, even this requires a drastic shift in campaign finances, self-discipline, and messaging that may be easier said than done.
Perhaps, then, parties can implement a vetting process, or “invisible primary,” in which influential affiliates can find the optimal candidate to invest in who is “not so far off centre that he or she was unviable,” as Johnston explains. This means Democrats must shrug off far-left attempts to perpetuate highly polarizing aspects of ‘wokeness,’ and Republicans must see a far-right leadership campaign decisively fail. This is in effect what happened to the Canadian Conservatives, who dropped their divisive federal campaign manager Jenni Byrne after losing a 27-point polling lead in April’s election to Prime Minister Mark Carney whose centrist, technocratic platform was seen as transcending Poilievre’s polarizing name-calling. Byrne and Poilievre’s reliance on slogan-based us-versus-them rhetoric garnered comparisons to President Trump’s ad hominem attacks, and was thus perceived by her party’s elites as “a problem,” as Bricker highlights. In Johnston’s eyes, polarizing rhetoric is an effective way of keeping officeholders in their seats and “keeping enraged people in your base off your back.” To counteract it, candidates must energize those who are not enraged, as Carney demonstrated through a campaign that focused mainly on foreign relations issues regarding the U.S. and Trump rather than demeaning his opponent.
In reshaping “normative ideas of what’s appropriate,” Wilson explains, Poilievre’s failure can inspire parties to commit to less polarizing platforms. Canada could benefit from greater top-down party influence on parties’ future leadership. Currently, under the “one member, one vote” system, every registered party member has a say in determining the party’s leader, leading to an increased reliance on populism and thus, frequently, polarizing rhetoric. Indeed, in the words of Johnston, “once you let the populist genie out of the bottle, it’s very hard to put it back in.” However, perhaps the best strategy for national depolarization through the structure of party politics has not yet arrived, as an “invisible primary” risks a major democratic deficit by removing from voters the agency to choose party leaders.
Ultimately, both the U.S. and Canada have significant room to grow, and many elements that curb polarization in the Canadian system are not readily applicable to the United States. In order for America to reduce polarization, its leaders will need to look beyond party politics to the promising potential of bipartisan governance.
The Need for True Bipartisanship
An important aspect of any depolarization strategy must include a greater focus on consensus-building through messaging and achievable projects. Bricker argues that former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau actively chose not to bring Canadians together while in a position of power and authority, labeling his political opponents as “racists” or “un-Canadian” with “Olympic-level” virtue signaling. Democrats in the U.S. are similarly blamed for listening but failing to make substantial progress on their promises, a dilemma only solvable through electoral success and bureaucratic reform.
If, then, actions speak louder than words, how can policymakers reconcile achievable progress with bipartisan cooperation, which is inherently burdened by the deliberative process? There may not be a clear answer, but leaders may still be able to reject various proposed ideas. Indeed, Bricker spots a central flaw in American political commentator Ezra Klein’s “abundance” agenda, which advocates for reduced regulations and an overwhelming focus on major projects. By abandoning the dialectical process of public hearings and environmental reviews, “you end up in China” as Bricker explains, wherein “great plans lead to great body counts” because utopian views of the world only serve the elites. Bipartisanship is imperative. Political disagreements are legitimate, so Americans must have faith in their democratic process to sort things out. For the sake of both countries’ fundamental values, American and Canadian politics must rely on cooperation.
In this endeavor, Johnston implores Democrats and Republicans to notice the common ground in their proposed policies. For example, he points out how the late Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy “could get into a room with John McCain or various other Republicans and make a policy deal in which the Democrats got the essentials of what they were advocating, particularly in health care.” As a result, bipartisanship is achievable when enduring policies constitute a pluralistic system, reconciling progressive and conservative platforms without rejecting useful policies. For instance, social security benefits will necessarily dwindle if citizens are not properly incentivized to advance the economy, conjoining traditionally Democratic and Republican ideals in one widely popular measure. Similarly, Johnston argues that fossil fuel production has a political weight disproportionate to its economic weight, thanks to a strong lobby well aware of the country’s historical reliance on nonrenewable resources. Conservatives would benefit from realizing the significant economic incentives rooted in renewable resources; there is a reason why Texas, with its frequent sunshine, has installed solar farms currently producing over 22,000 megawatts of energy.
Bipartisanship between parties with clearly-defined differences can be successful — and in some respects, more successful than centrism can ever become. Hardline party agendas tend to demand more ambitious results, and if cooperation is indeed a possibility, might greater partisanship be advantageous? From his experience at Ipsos, Bricker believes the motivating energy in most democratic societies does not lie in the center. The recent victories of Trump and New York City mayor Zohran Mamdani, for instance, demonstrate that greater affiliation with political extremes can affirm the public’s dissatisfaction with the direction of their communities. Merkley believes that Carney’s centrist platform, albeit “reasonable,” is not sustainable for the long term, as “breaking from the past” only gets you so far. It would be a “silly way of approaching the public” were a centrist leader to handicap his party’s potential for progress by intentionally depolarizing the political climate.
Governments have tangible tasks to accomplish. A stated centrist intent to limit a government’s potential could be just as detrimental to the broader society, where strong, top-down political action can be the most efficient way to get things done. Moreover, parties should be adequately different from one another. Strong centrism should not create too much consensus, as Johnston explains — otherwise, the potential for meaningful societal growth is limited. Wilson supports this claim, asserting that parties should maintain “clear, well-defined stances, which will sometimes robustly disagree with one another.” Nonetheless, the present situation of extreme parties with no cooperation simply yields gridlock. For party politics to produce outcomes for Americans, leaders must commit to the robust disagreement necessary for compromise.
When all is said and done, can the Canadian political system enlighten America in its quest to build a country where polarization takes a backseat to progress? Canada’s multiparty system and historical tradition of respect for diverse political perspectives are beneficial, but the two nations’ fundamental differences dampen the prospects of meaningful lessons learned. Moreover, neither country is in an ideal situation when it comes to seeing out policies and minimizing the presence of gridlock, highlighting the reality that America is not alone in its struggle with polarization.
One lesson in particular can be agreed upon, however: Bipartisanship is a priority. Cooperation is not the same as capitulation, and parties can still achieve tangible progress without compromising their core principles. The jury is still out on how to ensure cooperation with a strong majority government, but a focus on emphasizing the fact that we have much more in common than at first glance can lay the foundation for a less polarized future.
