Against Arms Sales to Taiwan

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Despite the Trump administration leaving the United States’ international reputation in tatters, it seems that the American alliance with Taiwan is as strong as ever. A large component of the U.S.-Taiwan alliance, established by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), is the U.S.’s provision of arms to Taiwan for self-defense. During the past four years, this component was significantly bolstered by the U.S.’ provision of large, consecutive arms packages to Taiwan. In 2020 alone, the U.S. sold a total of $5.1 billion in arms to Taiwan, including missiles, rocket artillery, coastal defense systems, aerial reconnaissance drones, 66 F-16 jets, and other smaller packages. However, many of these systems will not be delivered for at least another year, and with growing U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan, the U.S. should take this delivery time to reconsider these sales.

Tensions Build

China has reacted to these arms transfers with disdain. They have requested that the U.S. stop such sales, citing that they “seriously damage China’s sovereignty and security interests” as well as “China-U.S. relations and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” However, Chinese frustration with these sales is by no means unexpected. It is consistent with anger expressed after similar sales to Taiwan over the past decade, stemming from China’s focus on two primary goals:

(1) Cross-strait reunification. Interviews, secondary literature, and statements by policy elites in China repeatedly use the term “sacred commitment” to describe their drive to eventually reunify with Taiwan. With Macau (under Portuguese rule until 1999) and Hong Kong (under British rule until 1997) returned to China, Chinese desire for reunification with Taiwan has only grown stronger. The Chinese Communist Party’s political narrative centers around reunification, using it to bolster its legitimacy, shape Chinese culture, and generate nationalistic sentiment. In line with this, President Xi Jinping has announced cross-strait reunification as his primary goal and an inevitability, aiming for peaceful reunification but affirming the use of force if necessary.

(2) Expansion. China is a rising global power looking to increase its influence internationally, seen by growing engagement with international institutions and its role in leading Asian economic regionalization, among other events. Taiwan, as an American ally in close proximity to the mainland, has hindered China’s ability to expand its sphere of influence, serving as an American “base” of resistance to Chinese regional primacy. Taiwan has remained a beacon of democracy in East Asia, in direct contrast to Chinese authoritarianism, making it a key player in containing Chinese expansion.

Arms sales to Taiwan aggravate Chinese both of the aforementioned goals. China views arms sales as a direct military challenge to its regional primacy and arming Taiwan heightens the Chinese perception that Taiwan will engage in provocative behavior. Notably, China has repeatedly declared arms sales as violating the one-China principle and U.S.-China communiques and threatening Chinese interests in security and reunification. Thus, a democratic Taiwan, armed with missiles that can hit China’s East Coast and backed by the American military, perceptually both decreases the probability that reunification, for better or worse, occurs peacefully and reduces China’s ability to expand its regional influence. Correspondingly, U.S.-China relations have degraded, and China has rebuked the U.S. for its “egregious” actions, stating it will respond with force if necessary.

The Consequences

Recently, tensions between the U.S. and China have escalated quicker than expected, sparked by the 2020 arms sales, with China launching aggressive aerial “gray-zone” operations in December to intimidate Taiwan, toeing the line between war and peace. 

This shift to military tactics marks the beginning of an escalation spiral that, if not halted in the near future, could culminate in a U.S.-China war. As the frequency and flamboyance of such military “shows of power” heighten, clashes become increasingly inevitable. China has purposely kept its redlines vague as a deterrent measure, but the most likely scenarios for conflict would lead with either a well-planned land invasion or a conventional first-strike on Taiwan and would be followed by a naval blockade, cyberattacks, and aerial strikes. While the TRA does not require the U.S. to get involved in the case of a China-Taiwan dispute, the U.S. will likely be drawn in anyways due to the threat this poses to regional interests, particularly allies like Japan and South Korea, and its international standing as a defender of democracy. This could force an all-out conflict between two nuclear-armed superpowers. Ending arms sales would halt the escalation spiral and prevent such a conflict. 

Lawmakers in support of arms sales argue that strengthening Taiwan’s self-defense will deter China from starting a conflict, and while this was once an indisputable fact, the power of American deterrence is waning. First, the gap between China’s and Taiwan’s militaries is nearly insurmountable, with China’s aerial, naval, and hybrid capabilities being far more advanced and vast than Taiwanese defense systems. Second, while the U.S. military remains ahead of China, that advantage is diminishing rapidly. 

Per the Department of Defense, China is already outpacing the U.S. in missiles, shipbuilding, and air defense, which are the key capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and China is likely to close most remaining gaps within 5-10 years. In the face of a properly executed Chinese attack, Taiwan will certainly be helpless alone, and it seems American forces may face a tougher fight than anticipated. So, while the Chinese have not attacked yet, their calculus is likely to change in the coming years.

What’s to Come

It seems that the Biden Administration is intent on leaving arms sales in place. President Biden recently affirmed the U.S.’s commitment to Taiwan, noting the need to continue supporting democracies across the globe in the face of a rising, authoritarian China. Certainly, at a time when democratic backsliding is becoming a reality in many parts of the world, the U.S. must stand by its allies to preserve its international standing — in the case of Taiwan, however, arms sales are simply not an effective means to that end. They risk pushing tensions over the edge and in no way serve the deterrence purpose used to justify them.

The U.S. strategy without arms sales does not need to differ much from its current strategy. It should keep all other commitments to Taiwan the way they are per the TRA, which would retain any deterrent value that the U.S.-Taiwan alliance holds. The purpose of ending arms sales is neither to entirely resolve the U.S.-China-Taiwan dilemma nor is it to sever American ties with Taiwan: It is simply to prevent current stressors from escalating into armed conflict. If, after ending arms sales, the U.S. finds itself desperate to enhance its commitment to Taiwan, it should do so through non-military measures, like a civil service exchange or free trade agreement, which would indicate a clear U.S. commitment to Taiwan without militarily threatening China and its goals. 

There is a short span of time between now and the delivery of the arms to reconsider the current decision. In order to maintain cross-strait peace and prevent the escalation of tensions, the U.S. must swiftly act within this window to end its arms sales to Taiwan.

Image Credit: “An ROC Airforce F-16 fighter jet shadows a PLA Airforce Bomber that had approached the island of Taiwan” by Military News Agency, ROC is licensed under CC BY 4.0