Will Iran’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons persist in the next 10 to 15 years, or will they diminish into an afterthought due to regime change or Iranian moderation? The Obama administration, in its announcement of the framework agreement produced by the P5+1 and Iran on April 2, has based its policy on a belief in the latter answer.
Such a belief represents President Obama’s big bet: buying time rather than decisively resolving the issue of a nuclear Iran now. On Tuesday in an interview with NPR, the President owned this approach, asserting that “essentially, we’re purchasing for 13, 14, 15 years assurances that the breakout is at least a year,” with “breakout” referring to the span of time Iran will need to acquire and utilize the material necessary for creating a nuclear weapon. Currently, Iran’s estimated breakout time is two to three months. Thus the agreement significantly hampers Iran’s pursuit of a bomb while providing world powers like the United States with adequate time to identify possible Iranian cheating before circumstances become dire.
In addition, if the negotiated framework can be secured as a finalized deal before this summer’s July 1 deadline, it would reduce Iranian centrifuges by two-thirds, slash its supply of low-enriched uranium from 10,000 kilograms to 300, and enable the International Atomic Energy Agency to have wide-ranging authority to inspect all Iranian nuclear sites. Crucially, sanctions currently placed on the country would be suspended rather than permanently ended; they would “snap back” into place if Iran were caught cheating.
Many critics say that these terms are too lenient. Playing the waiting game, according to them, is too risky. But in closing the deal, the Obama Administration would actually be taking the safest available route. Realistically, the United States has three options: the present agreement, continued sanctions, or war. One must evaluate which of these options would best achieve the objective of preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons with the lowest probable costs.
Sanctions, while having exerted enough pressure on Iran to bring its leadership to the negotiating table, have not successfully halted its nuclear ambitions. In fact, even as the Bush administration rejected diplomatic agreements and forced Iran to endure years of harsh sanctions, the number of Iranian centrifuges has increased from under 200 in 2003 to 19,000 today. The nuclear program has marched on despite economic pressure.
On the other end of the strategic spectrum lies military aggression. If one were to listen to former UN Ambassador John Bolton, the answer would be to bomb Iran and, in effect, spark a new war in the Middle East. He cites the Israeli strikes on an Iraqi reactor in 1981 and a Syrian one in 2007 as precedents. Yet Iran today controls a vast network of facilities, including an underground site at Fordow, which would be difficult to take out even with an extended airstrike campaign. Furthermore, as Washington Post columnist and CNN host Fareed Zakaria points out, war would undoubtedly break up the present international coalition imposing Iranian sanctions, bolster support for Middle Eastern attacks against the United States, and ultimately increase the Iranian drive to pursue a bomb, as the regime would be fighting for its survival.
Rather than continuing a largely unsuccessful sanctions program or embarking on a strategically catastrophic military conflict that would potentially dwarf the war in Iraq, the United States should stay on the path of diplomacy. While the measures outlined in the framework agreement would only last for 10 to 15 years, they would allow the world to buy valuable time in stalling Iran’s nuclear program while enforcing tight restrictions and avoiding another conflict in the Middle East.
The waiting game, then, is a bet worth making.
