According to U.S. intelligence from early January 2022, it is now only a matter of weeks before Iran obtains enough enriched material for a nuclear weapon. In response, policymakers in the U.S. and other members of the P5+1 (China, Russia, France, U.S., U.K., and Germany) are scrambling to strike a deal with a quickly proliferating Iran, despite constraints both at home and abroad.
Discussions in Vienna have largely focused on reviving a deal reminiscent of the Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a multi-year agreement which limited Iran’s potential for uranium enrichment in exchange for the lifting of hardline sanctions on Iran. When first imposed, this agreement was met with backlash from U.S. strategic partners in the region who rely on the U.S. for security commitments to balance against Iran. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel have outwardly expressed worry that the withdrawal of U.S. support and oversight will give the green light to Iran for further proliferation and more aggressive policies.
The JCPOA was short-lived. The Trump administration promptly withdrew from the deal, one of the many multilateral agreements that it nixed. Instead, the Trump administration employed a hardline strategy of sanctions and travel bans, restricting the entry of Iranian citizens into the country. These forms of U.S. hard power have devastated the Iranian economy, with increasing unemployment and declining oil exports causing a precipitous decline in the value of the Rial. This has further worsened relations between the two nations, motivating Iran to respond with increasingly aggressive proliferation efforts.
Biden is fighting an uphill battle in attempting to devise an acceptable alternative to the JCPOA and remedy the damage done in previous administrations. He faces fierce opposition at home, as well as roadblocks set by U.S. partners in the Middle East. These constraints must be addressed in order to pass a deal that garners bipartisan support, ensures its longevity, and maintains the U.S.’s strategic partners in the Middle East.
Biden’s Domestic Constraints
Biden, who claims to rely on diplomacy-based foreign policy of multilateralism, is now tasked with crafting a new nuclear deal that satisfies a wide range of actors, both domestic and international. At home, Biden must assuage the fears of many Democrats who are eager to enter into any deal, no matter the drawbacks. At the same time, Biden must address the concerns of the vast majority of Republicans, and an increasing number of Democrats, who are concerned with the concessions the U.S. must make in order to strike said agreement. Additionally, Republicans vehemently disapprove of the way by which Biden is pursuing a reconfigurated JCPOA.
Republican senators, such as Ted Cruz, are adamant about blocking a potential deal, remarking that “this attempt to usurp power from Congress will be met with a sustained and aggressive response.” Cruz and his Republican counterparts are not only outraged by what they view as an attempt by the Biden administration to circumvent the traditional action channels of Congress (in this case, submitting for Senate approval as an official treaty). They also believe that the administration’s decision to lift sanctions puts light to threatening anti-American and anti-Israeli Iranian rhetoric and policies that deny the existence of Israel. Cutting Iran too much slack while they have already obtained a high level of enrichment, they argue, could further embolden Iran to pursue regional hegemony. Cruz’s language like “usurpation” is not an accurate representation of Biden’s actions. However, it conveys concerns about an emboldened Iran, which could lead to Irannian exploitation of new economic vitality as well as closer relations with China and Russia.
Many Democrats, save for several senior officials who have joined the opposition, are not willing to uphold a Trump-like posture towards Iran reliant on hard power. Instead, Democrats largely view any deal as better than nothing, and are therefore willing to make significant concessions. This includes sacrificing a deal that secures more regime support for human rights, withdrawal of support for violent Shi’a groups such as Hezbollah and Houthi forces in Yemen, and a diminished ballistic missile program.
Although the deal is likely to pass without bipartisan support, Biden should not dismiss Senate Republicans, as isolating himself certainly would jeopardize the longevity of the already shaky deal. As we saw in the case of the Trump and Obama administrations, a change in presidency could lead to the withdrawal of a nuclear deal once again, making Biden’s current version of the deal a mere band-aid rather than an effective solution.
Biden’s International Constraints
While partisan politics have led to domestic constraints on Biden’s potential to close a nuclear deal with Iran, the stances of U.S. strategic partners in the Middle East states are perhaps of greater importance. Israel, along with Gulf states such Saudi Arabia and the UAE, all of whom previously opposed the 2015 JCPOA, are unsurprisingly opposed to Biden’s attempted revival of the deal.
Similar to the Republicans, the United States’ Middle Eastern strategic partners are less concerned about what is included in the deal, and more about what is not. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE call for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, explicit distancing of the country’s government from Shi’a extremist groups, and a weakened Iranian ballistic missile program, as mentioned above. Israel’s Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, has denounced a JCPOA revival numerous times on the international stage, and has sent Israeli officials to the U.S. to discuss the dangers of making too many concessions simply for the sake of closing a deal.
The open disapproval of a new deal by these states, who are key actors in helping to balance Iran, should be taken seriously. If Biden makes too many concessions, this deal has the potential to sow lasting distrust between the US and its strategic partners, resulting in potential instability across the region. Biden would be remiss to not prioritize relations with these geostrategically important countries which open doors to oil, trade routes, and most importantly, the opportunity to ward off the increasing influence of illiberal states in the region.
The Abraham Accords, a gem in Trump’s otherwise inconsistent foreign policy strategy in the Middle East, catalyzed the normalization of Arab-Israeli relations throughout the region. There were two key incentives for Arab states’ normalization with Israel: mutual defense against Iran, and to gain rewards and favor from the U.S. However a new nuclear deal could throw these accords into contention, as the still recent partnership, which was facilitated by the U.S., will inevitably be stressed as a result of the U.S. ‘s largely unpopular decision to pursue a new, arguably less effective deal. The deal, which presses on deep seated fears in the region that the U.S. will abandon its security commitments and leave their partners with a diminished security apparatus, could come into play with the accords in two ways.
Firstly, although the accords center around mutual economic benefit, we should not underestimate the role of mutual distrust of the U.S.’s security commitment, as well as mutual opposition to Iran, to strengthen them. In light of Iran’s increasingly aggressive ballistic missile program, which has targeted the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and has the potential to cause serious damage to Israel, the countries have been especially united.
Secondly, as a result of a diminished Arab-American relationship, the accords could be weakened, as a large motivation for states to enter the accords was to gain American favor. With diminished relations between Arab countries and the U.S. as a result of the deal, the draw to maintain strong ties with Israel is lessened.
To circumvent both of these scenarios, the U.S. should seriously consider the voices of its strategic partners in the region. Recently normalized relations should be leveraged by the U.S. to strike a multilateral nuclear deal which has buy-in from all parties. Additionally, this is a significant opportunity for Biden to improve upon his legacy in the Middle East, which currently revolves around his controversial withdrawal from Afghanistan. In light of Iran’s proliferation and growing fears of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, this is a significant moment in international security. Biden must be decisive and diplomatic, as his response has the potential to shape the future of nuclear nonproliferation.
Image by Kilian Karger is licensed under the Unsplash License.
