Has the time finally come for peace? This is the question Colombians are asking themselves as peace talks are being held in Havana, Cuba between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a militant Marxist rebel group responsible for a fifty-year long civil war, which resulted in generations of Colombians growing up without ever knowing peace. FARC describes themselves as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group based on agrarian equality and anti-imperialistic rhetoric. This group emerged from the power struggle between the liberals and conservatives during the decade known as La Violencia from 1948-1958, set off by the murder of liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. From there, violence ensued and claimed the lives of 300,000 individuals, mostly farmers and peasants. The period ended when the liberal and conservative parties agreed to the National Front, a pact that stipulated that every election cycle the parties would alternate turns in power. The government established agricultural-complex estates across the nation designed for exportation rather than local consumption.
With just 5 percent of the population owning 75 percent of the land, the subsequent poverty led to a major revolutionary crisis and the birth of FARC in 1964. In the years after its inception, FARC has achieved international infamy for its use of kidnappings, other terrorist tactics, and mass production of cocaine. The twenty-first century has seen the group severely weakened, with many of its leaders killed in raids and its funding severely undercut under the leadership of Álvaro Uribe, the Colombian president from 2002-2010. Unfortunately, FARC is now regaining power and strength since Juan Manuel Santos, the incumbent president, took power in 2010; his more diplomatic approach has allowed a resurgence by FARC, making the outcome of these current peace talks increasingly uncertain.
The current talks do not mark the first time peace negotiations have occurred. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, President Andrés Pastrana championed the end of conflict through dialogue. Unfortunately, the talks broke down, as the parties could not agree on the terms of negotiations, particularly those concerning compensation for victims, subjugating Colombians to another ten years of warfare. As this new round of peace talks begins, the Santos government is facing renewed complications with the situation with FARC but both sides have agreed to allow Norway to mediate the first round, and for Cuba, due to its extensive knowledge of Colombia’s situation, to mediate the second round.
The Delegations in Charge
In these peace talks, the Colombian government is led by former Vice President Humberto de la Calle, who has previous experience from the failed peace talks of the Pastrana era. As Libia Tomatillos, a Colombian businesswoman, puts it to the HPR, “[De la Calle] is the link Colombia has to a peaceful future, and even if he is not your favorite Chief Negotiator, we Colombians must support his diplomatic tactfulness for any gleam of hope.” Other members of the delegation include Frank Pearl, the ex-Commissioner for Peace; Sergio Jaramillo, the current Commissioner for Peace; Police Captain Oscar Naranjo; retired army General Jorge Enrique Mora; and President of the National Industrial Association Luis Carlos Villegas. However, critics of the Santos government claim that nepotism and favoritism plague the delegation. Santos’ brother, Enrique, and Alejandro Éder, one of the President’s advisors, are among the more controversial members, with some Colombians questioning their emotional and mental investment in the peace talks. Another issue is the military’s involvement with the negotiations. The military’s prestige and importance in Colombia stems from its defense against FARC’s guerilla warfare; even though they wish to see an end to the violence, they want to maintain their influence over Colombian society, which might be diminished if FARC is dismantled. Yet, even with these possible flaws in the delegation, RCN, a major news channel in Colombia, has reported that an overwhelming majority of Colombians support the negotiations.
Likewise, FARC’s delegation is also embroiled with controversy. Their chief negotiator is Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” infamous for being the leader of the Caribbean Block (FARC’s regional organization on the Caribbean coast) and responsible for the spread of cocaine production in this region. Other members include Jesús Santrich of the Caribbean Block and Rodrigo Granda, a leading member of the Occidental Block. Simón Trinidad, who is currently facing a sixty-year jail sentence in the United States for his role as a co-conspirator in the kidnapping of the three American businessmen in Colombia, is participating in the talks through Skype. Rounding out the delegation are Pablo Catatumbo of the Occidental Block, who is personally in charge of establishing drug routes from Colombia to other nations; Tanja Nijmeijar, a Dutch expatriate who joined FARC as an interpreter and international advocate for the organization; and Mauricio Jaramillo, the official doctor of FARC. Many Colombians, outraged that these men are free to carry out their business (under the auspices of the communist Cuban government) have led protests and demanded that the government arrest the FARC leaders rather than “continuing negotiations with criminals.”
Points in Discussion
There are five major points that these negotiations will cover:
Point 1: Politics of integral agricultural development FARC is demanding the creation of Territorios Campesinos based on Marxist ideologies of communal farming and collectivization. They want autonomy at an administrative and economic level from the government to pursue the mechanism of communal farming and a production of necessary exports to decrease socioeconomic inequality. The main issue for the government is that this proposal requires an agricultural constitutional reform, which will be difficult given that the “Paro Agrario” reform created a stalemate in the government in May, produced by an excessive agricultural tax that drastically reduced profits for farmers. President Santos would also have to hand out nature reserves for the use of estates and communal farming, damaging the environment.
Point 2: Political participation The Colombian government must meet the democratic necessity of allowing political participation for all ideologies without creating a cushion of convenience for FARC after its violent campaign in Colombia. The government wants to avoid a repeat of the 1985 disaster known as the party of Unión Patriótica, which was composed of communists and FARC members who still championed the use of arms as a means of achieving their socialist goals, producing a countermovement of paramilitaries and even more violence against Colombians. Granting amnesty to guerilla fighters is very controversial; the negotiations will attempt to settle which felony convictions (drug trafficking, extortion, or kidnapping) can prevent political participation for FARC members. 71 percent of Colombians are against the government giving impunity to these criminals, making this a particularly difficult point of negotiation. The government itself is torn about its stance; President Santos stated in his election campaign that jail might be necessary for peace to appeal to the general public, however, his defense minister has stated that alternate punishments may be used to ensure an end to the conflict.
Point 3: The end of the conflict Ending hostilities will require FARC to surrender its arms, as well as allowing members to reintegrate into the general Colombian population. From this point, legal tension arises from FARC’s demands that the Colombian government restructure the military forces to cope with the demands of both rural and urban civil societies, but the Statute of Rome declares that violators of human rights do not have the right to exercise legal and social services, placing Colombia in the unenviable position of attempting to both support the statute and appease the rebels.
Point 4: A solution to the problem of illicit drugs The cultivation of drugs and the expansion of drug trafficking have not only served as the financial backbone for the rebels, but have also influenced the direction and severity of the conflict. This point of discussion generates the most optimism for the negotiations, as both sides have agreed that manual eradication is the best method to end the cultivation of drugs. The government has also supported FARC’s feverous opposition to ending the production of illicit drugs that are specifically used for ancestral purposes by indigenous people.
Point 5: Victims Probably the most delicate and controversial of the five points, this topic of negotiation concerns victims of the civil war and how those people should be defined. Traditionally, victims are defined as those who have been murdered or kidnapped by FARC, but members of the rebel group also consider themselves victims of the government’s unfair and heinous practices due to social inequality and political quelling. Victims and their families deserve reparations, both material and emotional, for the war, especially those who do not know the whereabouts of loved ones. FARC has agreed to create a council of truth to inform victims’ families about their loved ones; however, the general Colombian public feels as though it will be too hard to repay these victims. As the Attorney General, Alejandro Ordóñez, remarks, “It is impossible […] to forget the existence of crimes against humanity committed by the FARC […] There cannot be absolute impunity.”
Only the first, second, and fourth points have been discussed so far, while the more controversial third and fifth points are still pending. Though these points are a starting block for ending the conflict, there are other issues, such as international Marxist support, minefields, and possible splinter groups, that also need to be addressed.
Current Response to the Situation
Though peace is in everyone’s prayers, there is a faction of the Colombian government on the right that feels that the current peace talks will fail like those during the Pastrana government. The Uribistas (from ex-President Uribe) agree with the ideology that the only way to make peace is through unconditional surrender. Like Uribe, Ana Isabel Yepes, who was part of Zuluaga’s campaign and believes these peace talks will be ineffective and counterproductive to ending the civil war, states, “To compromise with the those criminals would mean stooping down to their level and will eventually lead to more problems.” The political opposition in Colombia, controlled by the leftist coalition of Socialists, Liberals, and the Green Party, has placed their full support in these talks, most likely due to the fact that their political agenda does not diverge significantly from the ideological goals of the Marxist FARC.
The general international opinion is favorable towards the peace talks, as it marks an opportunity for peace to spread into this growing and prosperous nation. Organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Andean Community have expressed their encouragement of the talks in Oslo and Havana. Simultaneously, however, human rights organizations have insisted that violators cannot be pardoned for their abuses. Though people are divided over the way the current government is handling the delicate situation, it is a given fact that all Colombians want peace. These talks might not give them that coveted treasure, but it shows that both parties are headed in the right direction. Colombia has suffered long enough. Yes, the time for peace is now, but whether the current negotiations in Havana will achieve this dream is still to difficult to determine.
Image source: The Christian Science Monitor, Fernando Vergara/AP
