Somewhere between Friday classes and All Soul’s Mass, I browsed through a few old emails from the Crimson (the ones ignored during midterm season). Especially considering the day, I was particularly interested in an article from John F.M. Kocsis titled “In GOP We Trust.” Growing up in Southwest Ohio I experienced much the same upbringing he describes: Catholic, Catholic, and more Catholic. Democrats were a rare breed, and not a very accepted one at that. His surprise to hear they’re regarded as a Democratic constituency probably isn’t uncommon among suburban Catholic teenagers; yet, I think many political observers might take a different view of Catholic political trends than he does. The rise of Catholics as a swing vote hasn’t suddenly occurred thanks to John Boehner and Paul Ryan, nor should Catholics be considered one like-minded voting bloc.
Kocsis’s analysis ignores a few historical points that deserve some recognition. He asserts an ongoing “general shift toward the GOP” for this once Democratic voting bloc; perhaps true, but this analysis is some 40 years behind. During that time (when exit polls came into fashion), Catholics have voted for the presidential popular vote winner every time, always with percentages within a few points of the national average. John F. Kennedy may have secured the demographic for ten years, but he also gave Catholics national recognition—Protestant animosity began to dissipate, thus calming anti-Catholic feelings within the GOP. Following, Nixon and Reagan both handily won the Catholic vote, and Catholic John Kerry even lost it. Kocsis’ assertion that current Republican Catholics mark a shift in voting patterns simply doesn’t correlate with past evidence; the claim that suburbanization caused the right-ward shift fundamentally ignores the timing of the shifts.
Furthermore, he ignores the divide between “traditionalist Catholics” and “adaptive Catholics,” two groups as distinct as any two denominations. The former are your old-fashioned church-going, pro-life suburban Republicans that he and I grew up with; these are the types that indeed drifted right based on social values and reconciliation with evangelicals. The latter, however, symbolizes most Catholics—maybe church-goers, maybe not, but definitely not defining themselves by religion. Thus, the majority of Catholics are pro-choice, pro-gay marriage, and birth control users. When SNL teased Joe Biden and Catholics in general for ignoring the pope, well, there was a seed of truth. Dividing the Catholic vote between traditionalists and progressives can be a little tricky, but political scientists are quick to distinguish the two in some fashion when analyzing trends.
Catholics have long been freed from the Democratic unity that once dominated certain cities, but to call them a “swing” group doesn’t take into account the vast differences among 80 million people. A division exists: a heavily Republican minority with an independent but Democratic-leaning majority. The latter represents a more secular brand of Catholicism that identifies more as being moderate, liberal, libertarian, conservative, Hispanic, African-American, Asian-American, or simply American; these further divisions better predict voting trends than one overarching connection. Though I admit that this is self-serving, Catholics should be applauded—especially in light of former biases forcing them to the Democratic Party—as a group symbolic of American separation of church and state.
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