“Completely illegal and unjustifiable,” Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao decried Japanese actions in late 2012, after Japanese officials arrested Chinese trawler captain while fishing near one of the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. A year later, China responded by extending an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the islands – which the Chinese and most Westerners call the Diaoyu – challenging Japanese and South Korean competing claims to the islands. Yet, on November 7, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Abe had their first meeting since either of them took office, reaching a 4-point understanding, acknowledging continued disagreement but bilateral de-escalation concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku. Separately, on November 11, 2014, President Barack Obama and President Xi signed another landmark agreement, the bilateral Climate Change and Clean Energy Cooperation Deal, targeting carbon dioxide emissions. This decline in aggression in the East China Sea, accompanied by rebuilding of relations with Japan is motivated by the same strategy as the signing of the climate deal: a Chinese version of smart power.
Smart power was originally defined in an exclusively American context by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as being “neither hard nor soft—[smart power] is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action.” China has adopted this American smart power strategy, enhancing China’s influence with its neighbors, as well as challenging U.S. hegemony in the region.
Smart Power with Chinese Characteristics
The Chinese historically have had a steady grasp on the usage of soft power. In an interview with the HPR, Professor Joseph Nye, the foremost scholar on smart power, stated that China’s “basic aim is to combine hard and soft power. In 2007, [former Chinese President] Hu Jintao told the 17th Party Congress that China needs to increase its soft power. If your hard power is increasing, you’re likely to frighten your neighbors, but if you increase your soft power at the same time, you’re less likely to make coalitions against you. In that sense, the aim is a smart power policy.”
The combination of a stable, pragmatic regime upheld by Confucian values reassures international partners – indicating the presence of soft power. Conflict over oil fields and competing claims to the Diaoyu islands, however, recently incentivized the use of hard power in the East China Sea. The underlying cause of the conflict is a shift in economic power: China’s meteoric rise and Japan’s lengthy economic stagnation. China’s strong and more diverse economy intimidates Japan. Meanwhile, China is threatened by Japan acting – as Historian and Professor at the London School of Economics Odd Arne Westad commented – “as an unsinkable American aircraft carrier just off its coast.” China’s aggression is an indication of its desire to convert economic primacy into hard power to control the islands. In contrast, Japan aims to avoid setting the precedent of yielding to China’s offensive policy. Throughout the summer of 2014, China continued to harass Japanese fishing vessels as a show of sovereignty in the coveted waters – even though Japan is backed by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. China openly vied for dominance in East Asia, challenging overt U.S. allies for regional hegemony.
The potential for escalation was dire. A perceived imbalance in military prowess in the East China Sea provoked a sharp turn to the right in Japanese politics, reflected in the popularity of conservative Prime Minister Abe. Though currently prohibited from building up military power by the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty, Japan could nuclearize within one year after shedding the U.S. security alliance.
Yet, the tensions over the islands did not escalate. Rather, the historic handshake between Xi and Abe in November 2014 rejuvenated stalled bilateral agreements and discussions, as well as created a new Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century, with a mechanism for crisis aversion in the East China Sea. In the next month, China withdrew the consequences of violating the Chinese ADIZ, further deescalating the situation.
Furthermore, the recent climate deal diverges from all past global warming-related plans in that the commitment to peak emissions by 2030 actually requires a deviation from existing Chinese government policy. Usually, Chinese-implemented climate change policies only promise emissions reductions that do not interfere with domestic production. This climate deal is the first not to be shaped by domestic concerns and appeasements. Rather, Xi Jinping is allowing the international effort to impact domestic policy and progress. Moreover, most deals are unilaterally presented, indicating Chinese independence from foreign influence, whereas the recent agreement was announced jointly. Perhaps most importantly, the climate deal signaled a shift to smart power in that China embraced the opportunity to be seen as an international actor for the global good.
Xi’s sharp, domestically unpopular deviation from the aggressive, nationalistic policy of late-2013, follows the model delineated by G. John Ikenberry for a maturing power. A country ready to accept the responsibility for the global good as an international actor exhibits “strategic restraint.” China ended its hard power challenge of Japan, limiting the returns to power for any other East Asian country; after China set the precedent for restraint instead of dominance for the sake of stability, there is little incentive for another East Asian country to attempt power projection.
In contrast, the so-far peaceful rise of China is also a result of the U.S. – an unarguably mature power – exhibiting substantial restraint, purposefully avoiding direct confrontation with China. American interaction with China has recently danced around the real areas of concern – territory and military buildup. For this reason, it is not surprising that China’s pivotal shift to smart power occurred in a joint venture for emissions reduction – an issue unrelated to hard power concerns.
Why is it working now? – 3 Reasons
Like a growing organism, China’s rise depends on channeling all vigor toward healthy development, avoiding the diversion of precious energy. In order to establish a successful smart power strategy, China has three vital tools to kill off harmful parasites inhibiting its rise: Xi Jinping’s executive stance and party cohesion, the traditional Chinese long-term thinking, and international credibility, especially compared to the United States.
The first sign of a successful shift to smart power – and the triumph of the growing organism – is Xi Jinping acting executively, no longer “the first among equals, but simply first.” President Xi’s foreign policy has previously been driven by domestic concerns, failing to be an international actor for global good as his actions were merely reactionary to domestic noise. Moreover, Xi came to power when the Communist Party was overrun with corruption, inefficiency, and paralyzed in terms of foreign policy, failing to respond effectively to crises in Libya, Syria, and North Korea. Xi accepted that long-term goals rely on forgoing the appeasement of all sectors of Chinese society, drowning out domestic outcry with the promise of a visionary, brighter future.
Secondly, China has touted successful, insightful long-term views, coupled with guidelines laid out by former “paramount leader” of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping, including ‘avoiding the limelight’ and ‘never becoming a leader.’ Xi Jinping’s more assertive and militaristic foreign policy posture appears to be in direct opposition with Deng’s humble prescription. Yet, the reality of a conciliatory and smart stance toward the East China Sea indicates that Xi is not as divergent as he claims to be.
Thirdly, China’s modus operandi includes no-strings attached policies with other countries. The type of interactions countries have with China is reliable, not contingent on Congressional approval, a four-year political cycle, nor American value preaching. If countries begin to prefer the more dependable Chinese soft power, China succeeds in threatening American leadership. When the United States suddenly reneged on the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, not only was American credibility endangered, but also such blunders emphasize U.S. shortsightedness and sentimentalism.
Global Implications
The United States’ stakes in East Asia are high and multifaceted. Ships carrying $1.085 trillion worth of goods and materials traveled between East Asia and the United States last year. If the United States loses its regional hegemony, it will be denied the benefits of deep, dynamic relations and engagement with the diverse economies of the region. Upon realizing their strategic positions as vital assets to the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam may pose the threat of shifting further into the Chinese sphere of influence in order to leverage greater commitments from the United States. Fortunately, relations with these countries are strong enough to withstand the increasingly persuasive economic power of China. Thus, any such threat lacks teeth. Only if these countries perceive that there is no longer a benefit to an alliance with the United States are they likely to prefer Chinese smart power. This means that the United States must balance strategic restraint – allowing for a peaceful Chinese rise – with constant reassurance to East Asian allies that U.S. interest lies with them.
Constant reassurance to allies in the region, however, has not been an American forte, especially as foreign policy tends to be subject to domestic uncertainty. Thus, the potential for a shift to Chinese influence should not be discounted. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) demonstrates an example of this shift. ASEAN was established in 1967 as a U.S. foothold in the region, and a way to bolster against Communist expansion. Yet, American politicians have overlooked the long-term strategic importance of ASEAN, and the Chinese have taken advantage of this notable power vacuum. The U.S. has either accidentally granted China a significant podium from which to foster the East Asian Community, or the United States has attempted to exhibit strategic restraint and is now allowing a forum for Chinese expansion in a controlled environment. Either way, the United States needs to enhance its presence in the region, or risk being excluded entirely from Xi Jinping’s proposal – mainly for nationalist, domestic consumption – of an Asia for Asians.
It is safe to assume Xi Jinping does not support subverting U.S. global hegemony at this point. Huge, international problems such as global warming requires multilateral actions and, moreover, U.S. involvement and global leadership. The climate deal is indicative of Chinese awareness that unilateral smart power would fail. However, a U.S.-China partnership does not depend on U.S. preeminence in Asia; China can undermine regional hegemony while retaining the possibility of U.S.-sponsored multilateralism globally.
The United States, then, must balance the instinct to challenge China in East Asia, while supporting China’s new interest in joint ventures for the global good. When CSIS defined smart power in 2007, there was no consideration of the possibility that China could successfully use a smart power strategy without the US. Moreover, it is clear that the United States is no longer dealing with a China stunted by domestic diversion, but a rising China harnessing smart power. The decision to use smart power regionally also explains China’s extension of its smart power strategy to the United States, implicit in the climate deal. Both of those actions are geared toward the same end, which is to solidify China’s status as the regional hegemon.
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons, U.S. Department of State
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