This interview, conducted by HPR correspondents Saswato Ray and Jay Hong Chew, has been edited for length, and clarity.
The drastic escalation of tensions along the Ukraine-Russia border has kept observers on edge as to what may happen next. In an interview with the Harvard Political Review, Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Bill Taylor, Vice President, Russia and Europe at the US Institute of Peace and Ambassador Paula Dobriansky, Senior Fellow of the “Future of Diplomacy Project” at the Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs and former Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, share their thoughts about the unfolding crisis at the first in-person JFK Jr. Forum of the year last Wednesday.
HPR:
A very good afternoon to both! Thank you for agreeing to this interview with us.
We would like to start off with a question on what actions have been taken to address the crisis thus far, and what outcomes you anticipate moving ahead. From what we can tell, the current administration has not yet taken any constructive public steps towards stopping Russia; despite the fact that in previous administrations, the issue [of the Ukraine-Russia crisis] has been brought up time and time again. The alleged provision of Ukrainian intelligence in exchange for American security guarantees was the central contention in Trump’s first impeachment [in 2020]. What impact do you think that event had on the Kremlin’s perspective of the United States?
Bill Taylor:
He was probably pretty happy with what he saw President Trump doing with regard to Ukraine, with NATO and alliances more broadly. Under the Trump administration, there was strong support for Ukraine, as you just indicated, from the Congress as well, Republicans and Democrats, House and Senate, administration after administration in the past, had all indicated and taken steps to support Ukraine through economic and military support all the way through.
The problem for the Trump administration was that they were incoherent between the top and the rest of the administration. So, the rest of the administration, as an example, decided to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons for the first time. As a matter of fact, the Obama administration didn’t. They provided other military equipment, but not lethal weapons to help Ukrainians defend against an attack. The Trump administration did.
Well, let’s talk about President Putin.
This current administration, however, has been more coherent, top to bottom, and very active diplomatically and militarily with Congress. I have never seen this in my experience; the level of diplomatic activity focused on support for Ukraine and opposition to a Russian invasion than this: unprecedented, in my experience, and most people I’ve talked to. So I would say: what did the Russians think of the previous administration – they were probably happy because they thought that President Trump was going to make a deal with them. It’s clear that President Biden does not.
Paula Dobriansky:
I make two points that will take your question and actually look at it more strategically. I think that every US president has striven to seek a good relationship with Russia. When I think of it, if I’m looking at Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump and right up to President Biden… the fact is that Putin in 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, gave a speech where he stated very clearly: “Western values are not our values. If any ethnic Russian is harmed, no matter where we will have the right to go in and assist and he went on in terms of his vision.”
So my response would be that the vision has been constant from administration to administration. I think that we have seen aggression in George W. Bush, in the case of Georgia, in Obama, we saw aggression in 2014, in Crimea. Putin has been very strong and very consistent in dealing with the deck of cards before him in order to move forward in the fulfillment of this vision.
Secondly, I would just say a footnote on Trump. I think that the policies that were pursued sent a rather strong signal: the former deployment, the enhanced military investment, enhanced military sanctions, the very clear statement against Nord Stream II. I think that there were policies and actions in place that signaled clearly what intentions the Trump administration had.
HPR:
Thank you for that. Building on this, Russia has consistently opposed NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. For instance, the ‘not one-inch’ eastward rule, and the creation of a new bloc that could potentially counter the growth of Russia. Now, there’s, of course, intense Russian antagonism against the West for having done this. Do you think that, as a form of military strategy to counter Russian antagonism or to counter Russian aggression, NATO needs to take a few steps back?
Taylor and Dobriansky:
No, no, no.
Bill Taylor:
A couple of things. One, there was no agreement about NATO and there was no consistent response from the Russians about it. Putin once flirted with the idea of joining NATO. Yeltsin did so too, so there were a lot of conversations with Gorbachev on how to reunite Germany and the ‘not one-inch’ policy. The ‘not one-inch’ quote, actually applied to East Germany, not to the rest of Europe. But at the time, there were US military bases in East Germany, and the Russians were okay with that and then not okay with that, and then okay with that and signed an agreement that acknowledged the legitimacy of these other nations who joined NATO. So they’ve been giving mixed signals.
Two, NATO didn’t sneak up and capture these European countries. No, these East European countries, after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, were free. And they looked around, and said, we’re threatened by the Russians. How are we going to secure ourselves? Let’s see if we can join a defensive alliance, I repeat, defensive alliance. There is no aggressive element to NATO whatsoever. The Poles and Czechosolvakia, the Romanians, the three Baltic states; they worried about the Russian aggression and they applied to and worked hard to meet the standards of NATO. NATO had to decide whether or not to let them in, and they did.
I don’t think that President Putin gets to tell the Ukrainians or Finns or the Swedes or the Georgians that they cannot apply. He can rattle that saber, but we’re staring him down. We’re not caving.
Paula Dobriansky:
All that, and a brief comment. NATO is a collective security defensive alliance. Secondly, it was Secretary of State James Baker, who on his watch, discussed these issues with Gorbachev. Thirdly, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken gave a very detailed press conference, in which he referred back to what took place between then-Secretary of State Baker and Gorbachev.
He also talked about the agreement: one, that Europe would remain full and free, with language to this effect, and Gorbachev acknowledged this statement. Secondly, the Russians reached out to join the NATO Russia Council, the purpose of which would be to notify and share information with Russia about any military exercise. In other words, there was transparency. Why I share this with you is because the bottom line: every effort was made here to be open in the process, so I think where we are now is a kind of revisionism and inaccuracy about what unfolded in this case. The Biden administration has stated upfront in these talks: No closing on the open door policy. Ukraine has a right to determine for itself whether it wants to join NATO.
HPR:
I’ll split my question into two parts. Firstly, how much is this a cementing of Putin’s personal legacy? And bringing in the idea of [the Biden administration’s] consistent efforts in diplomacy, how [do you think] Biden’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy influenced Russia’s response to the US’s foreign policy strategies as a whole? For Putin, why now?
Bill Taylor:
I think you’re exactly right [on the first part of your question]. Putin wants to be seen as a great Russian leader, a historical Russian figure, who brought Russia back together. He [wants to be seen as having] regathered the historical lands and Ukraine is the most important piece of that process. He sees that he will be close to being that Great Leader, only if he brings Ukraine back. He can’t, however, if he doesn’t dominate or reabsorb Ukraine.
In your question about China: in my own view, I’m in the minority here. I have always thought that Russia was the bigger, immediate threat compared to China, and that pivoting to Asia was misguided, because the immediate threat has been and clearly is today, that of Russia and the relationship it has with the larger world. That is the immediate threat. And you see this enormous diplomatic, military, and alliance management effort to challenge that threat and try to push back on President Putin so he doesn’t invade Ukraine. It is clear now what this administration’s focus is.
My view is that that should have been the focus all along. Now, China is clearly watching the US response to this threat against Ukraine. Putin and Xi think that [in this standoff], the United States is on its heels; look at Afghanistan for instance. But we are standing up. It turns out that we are still playing a major role in international affairs, standing up against autocracy, defending democracy. President Xi is undoubtedly watching that. And he’s probably a bit surprised. He thought we were stepping back from our global responsibilities. Now, he’s got to be concerned, surprised at the vehemence, and at the determination of President Biden.
Paula Dobriansky:
I’ll make three quick points. One, I think, is what I call ‘Putinism’. I don’t think it’s necessarily the perspective of the Russians or Russian people. This is about Putin and his vision that he has put forward and that he is advancing, but it’s not necessarily the view of the Russian people. So yes, it’s his legacy here.
Secondly, I think that he is seeking very much to diminish our power, and to fragment our relationships. I never had an issue of looking at Asia. I think we should be watching what’s happening in the Indo-Pacific, but I would never say to the exclusion of what was also happening with Russia. And for those that would say that Russia is the lesser power: the fact is that China has a very strong economic base, but it is Russia that has the nuclear weapons, and also that Russia has been an absolute disrupter time and again in various locations.
Thirdly, to address something you touched upon: I thought it was significant and bears close watching the relationship between Russia and China. We have witnessed what constitutes an alignment. Most would not say it’s a marriage of convenience, and most would not say it’s a formal alliance, but clearly they have similar objectives in the diminishing of US power, and also striving to put up barriers and ferment our close relationships with other countries, whether it be in the Indo Pacific or in Europe. This, I would say, is one of the most concerning times for US policy, foreign policy, and the time when US international engagement and leadership matters.
Bill Taylor:
I think as well, this is a moment of truth, for the Biden administration. If we stay tough, this will send a clear signal that the United States is back.
