David Thang Moe is a Postdoctoral Associate and Lecturer in Southeast Asian Studies at Yale University and Co-chair of the Religion in Southeast Asia Unit at the American Academy of Religion. He also holds academic affiliations with Harvard, Columbia, MIT, Boston University, and the University of Connecticut. Moe’s research focuses on religion and identity politics, especially in Myanmar.
The Harvard Political Review spoke to Moe in advance of his talk on campus “Becoming Ungovernable Beyond the State” on how Buddhist nationalism has taken shape in Myanmar, the evolving resistance movement there, and his hopes for ethnic reconciliation.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Harvard Political Review: Myanmar, your home country and area of research, remains in full-scale civil war that erupted after the 2021 military coup. Much of your work is around the notion that Myanmar’s military government, shaped by Buddhist nationalism, has come to treat minorities as enemies. How did Buddhism move from being a moral and inclusive tradition to being weaponized as a political tool?
David Moe: Buddhism is understood as a religion of peace, compassion, and morality. In Myanmar, Buddhism moved away from the moral traditions to a political tool of violence, nationalism, and exclusion after independence in 1948, especially under the military regime beginning in 1962. Political leaders, such as U Nu, the country’s first Prime Minister, promoted Buddhism as a state religion and as a core part of national identity by claiming that being truly Burmese means to be Buddhist. They linked Buddhism and national identity together. Along with that, nationalist monks and movements, such as “Ma Ba Tha,” or in English, the Association for the Protection of Race, Language, and Religion, used Buddhist ideas to portray minorities as threats to religion and nation. They claimed that to be Christian, Muslim, or Hindu in Myanmar means you are not authentic Burmese. As a result, Buddhism was often used to justify identity-based discrimination and violence against ethnic and religious minorities who are non-Buddhists.
HPR: Looking back at the 2021 coup itself, Myanmar’s highland regions historically did not engage with the state. What has changed since the coup? Why are these communities now rebelling against the state rather than avoiding it?
DM: Before the 2021 coup, the Bamar — the majority ethnic group in the lowlands — always misunderstood the ethnic minorities in the highland regions as rebel insurgents (“tha-pung” in Burmese, with a negative connotation) due to their frequent demands for greater autonomy, or even states of their own. But since the 2021 coup, the Bamar have put their differences aside, and many have fled from the lowlands to the highlands, taking refuge from the liberated ethnic minority regions beyond the central state, and getting armed training from those ethnic minorities.
Together, they are confronting the military state because decades of repression, broken ceasefires, systemic discrimination, and political oppression have left them with little hope that avoidance will ensure their safety or autonomy. Avoiding the state is no longer possible, as the military government’s everyday violence, airstrikes, and repression have reached both lowland and highland areas. Many see resistance as the only viable path to protect their communities.
HPR: What made the 2021 coup so distinct and “unprecedented” when compared to prior revolutions in Myanmar?
DM: The first significant revolutionary movement was back in 1988, when Aung San Suu Kyi came back to Myanmar to take care of her ill mother, Daw Khin Kyi, the widow of national independence hero Aung San She, then became a part of — and later a leader of — the anti-regime resistance. This first movement was mainly led by the Bamar Buddhist majority group, many of whom were university students, and it was directed against the military government. The second revolution took place in 2007 and is known as the Saffron Revolution, as it was mainly a nonviolent series of demonstrations and protests by Buddhist monks. Saffron is the name for the color of these monks’ robes.
The 2021 coup was met with a highly decentralized resistance, marking the movement’s first distinctive feature. It was driven by non-state actors and ordinary people who are not professional politicians. It extends beyond the high-profile political movement led by State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta expected that detaining Suu Kyi would quickly quell protest, but instead millions of civilians across the nation’s Christian hill villages and Buddhist valleys rose up in strong defiance. While this decentralized resistance has been vital, its limitation lies in the lack of unified leadership within the anti-coup movement and local governance structures.
Second, it is inclusively interreligious. In the past, only ethnic minorities, often Christians, resisted the state. In this current movement, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims all came together in shared solidarity, resisting the coup as “adharma,” a Buddhist religious term denoting moral wrong or evil. Some people even apologized for past behavior, since now they all are suffering under the military. So ethnic reconciliation is happening.
Third, there is significant diaspora mobilization against the coup. In 1988, not many Burmese were abroad. But today, there are many in the U.S., Canada, England, Australia, Norway, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and India, who share strong connections with people on the ground.
HPR: Is there a delicate balance between diaspora advocacy and not speaking over those on the ground?
DM: Absolutely. Social media creates a close connection between diaspora groups and people on the ground. In Myanmar, everything is on Facebook. While political elites often use X, ordinary people rely on Facebook to connect within pro-democracy movement communities. The diasporas can amplify these democratic voices, raise funds, and advocate internationally, becoming a voice for those on the ground without overshadowing them.
People in Myanmar cannot openly resist the regime due to the severe risks and dangers they face. But this does not mean that they comply with the regime; they engage in both hidden and public forms of what James Scott calls “everyday resistance.” Scott distinguishes between protest and resistance: Protest is often finite and episodic, whereas resistance is enduring and prosaic. Diaspora voices can amplify their concerns, yet there is a risk of imposing external ideas rather than truly representing local voices on the ground. Navigating this balance — amplifying without overriding — is crucial to enduring reciprocal participation in Myanmar’s democratic movement.
HPR: Federalism is often proposed as the solution to Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. Is federalism enough on its own? What would actually hold the country together?
DM: Federalism is an important option, as it would allow ethnic minority groups to exercise meaningful autonomy within their own states beyond a Buddhist nationalist central state. But federalism alone is not enough. Ethnic reconciliation is equally crucial. Myanmar faces deep-seated hatred and divisions among ethnic and religious communities, both at the national level and within smaller tribal groups. What will ultimately hold the country together is not just institutional design, but also healing, mutual recognition, mutual understanding, and the rebuilding of trust, so that people can see one another as fellow citizens of a shared national community.
HPR: Are there models Myanmar can look to for ethnic reconciliation or federal transition?
DM: Myanmar can draw lessons from several comparative cases, but no model can be copied wholesale. Countries like South Africa demonstrate the importance of truth-telling and reconciliation processes in addressing historical injustice. However, cheap national reconciliation cannot take place without restoring justice. Some have also looked to Indonesia — especially during Aung San Suu Kyi’s time — as an example of democratic transition from dictatorship.
In terms of federal models, some point to Switzerland as an example of multilingual federalism built on shared governance and local autonomy. Others look at the U.S. federal model. The challenge, however, is that in the U.S., ethnicity is generally less central to citizenship, while in Myanmar, ethnic identity has historically played a stronger factor in determining who is seen as fully belonging. Canada also shows how asymmetrical federal arrangements can accommodate distinct societies such as Quebec.
That said, Myanmar’s history, ethnic diversity, and ongoing armed conflicts make its situation unique. Comparative models can offer principles — power-sharing, decentralizing Burmanization, constitutional guarantees, and reconciliation mechanisms — but any sustainable transition must be locally grounded and negotiated among Myanmar’s own communities.
HPR: As a scholar with personal ties to Myanmar, how do you balance advocacy and academic objectivity?
DM: I see myself at the intersection of three spheres: academia, advocacy, and activism. Advocacy and activism are like two arms of my academic work, but I keep scholarship at the center. My research combines lived experience and evidence-based analysis. It’s not just intellectual reflection detached from real life.
Ultimately, my work is grounded in commitments to social justice, democracy, and peace. I am deeply inspired by my mentor, the late Prof. James C. Scott (“Shwe Yoe” in Burmese), who came of age as a pioneering Southeast Asianist scholar during the Vietnam War and later developed his influential academic voice on resistance amid Myanmar’s revolutionary movements. While advocating for Myanmar’s democracy, we taught courses on religion, politics, and decentralized resistance at Yale, among others. He shaped how I approach interdisciplinary scholarship: It should always be grounded in the perspectives of ordinary people. Born, raised, and educated in the remote village of Khin Phong in Upland Myanmar, I am deeply committed to bridging the gap between the ungovernable hill villages and the Ivy League.
