Dealing with the "Great Satan"

From the chants of “Death to America” during the storming of the U.S. embassy in 1979 to the frequent tweets by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamanei, Iran has maintained a string of public anti-American rhetoric. However, despite this legacy, and the normally contentious nature of Iranian domestic politics, the recently released framework agreement has received significant support across the Iranian political spectrum, hinting both to the willingness of the regime to negotiate and the continued power of Iran’s Supreme Leader in the complex and factionalized Iranian political system.
Factions tracing their origins back to the 1979 revolution are responsible for the diametrically opposed camps of Iranian politics and government. In the immediate post-revolutionary period in Iran, the competing factions who had made up the revolutionary alliance against the Shah essentially agreed to settle their disagreements at a later date. This led to a process of “dissonant institutionalization,” whereby competing ideas about state legitimacy and power structures were imbedded in the Iranian state. This dissonant institutionalization, which allocated some power to the civil republican structures of the government, and some to the revolutionary clerical structures, still defines splits in Iranian factional politics today, with pragmatists and reformists in favor of increased power for the republican elected government, while conservatives and hardliners favor increased power for revolutionary bodies.
These factions also have significantly different visions regarding foreign policy, which has helped define the terms of the debate on the nuclear negotiations with the United States. While reformers and pragmatists, such as President Rouhani, have favored negotiation and potential rapprochement with the United States, conservatives and hardliners such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and senior clerics have supported continued confrontation. Until recently, conservatives have been outspoken in their opposition to diplomatic route. Opponents of the deal held a conference in 2014 to oppose diplomacy, and multiple officials have spoken publically against concessions with statements like “if our soldiers evicted the enemy from our territory with least possible resources, we expect the team involved in the nuclear discussions to inflict firm defeat [to the enemy] in the negotiations with the P5+1.”
This previous intransigence, however, has almost entirely disappeared in the wake of the terms released regarding a framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1 on the Iranian nuclear. Multiple conservative leaders have spoken in favor of the accord reached by the foreign ministry negotiators, and despite prior resistance to concessions, the Iranian right appears unified behind the diplomatic process.
What accounts for this major shift? The most likely answer is the influence of Ayatallah Khamanei. Profiles of the Supreme Leader have noted that while he continues to distrust the West, and the United States especially, he is not opposed to the principle of negotiating over the nuclear program. Until 2013, however, Khamanei did not support serious negotiations as the United States had conditioned the opening of talks on a suspension of all Iranian uranium enrichment. The combination of the election of Hassan Rouhani, demonstrating strong popular support for diplomacy, and the American shift to cap enrichment levels while still allowing Iran to continue enriching, were crucial in shifting his attitudes. The Supreme Leader maintains constitutional power over significant areas of the state, including the armed forces, IRGC, judiciary, and Guardian Council. In addition to this, his position serves as the embodiment of the idea of “Velayat-e Faqih,” or guardianship of the jurists, a guiding ideological principle behind the founding of the Islamic Republic in Iran. As such, Khamanei holds the necessary constitutional and ideological power to compel the various factions, including the conservatives, into line behind a specific policy. His support for the negotiators suggests his influence is at work behind the scenes.
Despite the current support for the agreement in Iran, its longer-term fate within Iranian domestic politics is still tenuous, specifically if conservative factions are able to regain the upper hand over Rouhani in the domestic sphere. Khamanei has spelled out other conditions for an agreement that are incompatible with current American positions, and if he is not satisfied with the agreement, it may well founder. Additionally, he remains skeptical of American intentions, and any indication that the U.S. is not negotiating in good faith will cause him to side with conservatives over the pragmatists and end the talks. However, the domestic Iranian support shown for the nuclear has demonstrated two crucial details to Western policymakers: support among the Iranian people for an agreement remains very high, and the power of the Supreme Leader appears sufficient to coerce dissonant views into line behind the policy, suggesting that implementation of the agreement will not be contingent on Iranian domestic politics. Washington’s negotiating hand would be significantly strengthened if it could say the same.