Escaping the Poppy Field

American anti-opium efforts in Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s war-devastated economy has one booming sector ­- the country produces 90 percent of the world’s opium. Money from this trade funds insurgents and terrorists, and encourages corrupt government officials to undermine security and the rule of law. Nevertheless, for decades U.S. policy towards Afghanistan failed to acknowledge the impact of opium. But in a sign of progress, the 2009 U.N. Afghanistan Opium Survey showed that Afghan opium production decreased the past two years; this improvement can be attributed to the Bush administration’s eventual acknowledgement that opium production undermines stability in Afghanistan. More recently, the Obama administration has continued the Bush programs that facilitated the fall in production, while also eliminating the ineffective “eradication” approach. However, to sustain success, the United States must support a viable alternative crop economy for Afghan farmers, and build up American and Afghan security resources.
Fault by Omission?
While the United States is often blamed for not combating the Afghan opium trade sooner, it cannot reasonably be held responsible for its reluctance before 2001. Because the United States was providing covert aid to the Mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is conceivable that the problem could have been addressed then. But, as former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Tom Schweich told the HPR, “It’s simplistic to suggest the United States could have done much, considering we were not occupying the country and had limited influence.” While he conceded that, “failing to remain committed in the 1990s did precipitate the rise of the Taliban,” Schweich also argued the whole world abandoned Afghanistan. The United States was no more at fault than Germany, Canada or the United Kingdom.
U.S. negligence of opium after the 2001 invasion, however, did lead to a resurgence in opium cultivation. Lt. Col. Mark Wright, a spokesman for the Department of Defense, noted in an interview with the HPR that the opium trade “did not play a big role” in U.S. policy at the beginning of the war. Schweich attributed U.S. neglect to the DOD and military’s refusal to acknowledge that opium financed the Taliban and other insurgent forces. In his words, “Condoleezza Rice, General Jones, and the entire State Department saw it was important, but Secretary Rumsfeld would not let the military get involved in the drug problem.” Schweich continued to explain that this mistake allowed the Taliban to gain influence in Afghanistan; the military, he insisted, “should have enabled the civilian drug experts to do their jobs.” Ironically, by 2001, when the United States entered Afghanistan, the Taliban had eliminated up to 90 percent of poppy cultivation. The Taliban’s U.N.-supported eradication program was motivated by religious doctrine that opposed drug consumption, and by the fact that the Taliban had other sources of income. But by late 2001, the fall of the Taliban and the resulting economic collapse pushed poor farmers back to opium cultivation, and by 2002 the opium trade was equivalent to 27 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP. It was not until Defense Secretary Robert Gates took over that reducing opium cultivation became part of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
Untangling the Opium Web
Once the Bush administration realized the importance of eliminating opium cultivation, it implemented several successful programs that the Obama administration has continued. For example, as Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institute told the HPR, the Bush administration “focused on generating markets for farmers to grown new crops.” Schweich listed “access to market programs,” “better alternative development in crops,” and “cooperation with provincial governors” as leading factors contributing to the decrease in opium cultivation; Lt. Col. Wright specified that “Business development teams had good success in teaching farmers to produce alternative crops.” Interdiction, or tracking down and prosecuting traffickers, was also integral to the new approach. By 2008 and 2009, opium cultivation had decreased by 19 and 22 percent, respectively. Lt. Col. Wright believes that the Obama administration has taken the reduction of opium cultivation and the creation of new economic models for Afghan farmers very seriously, and Ambassador Schweich specifically praised Obama’s continued cooperation with local governors, support for farmers, and increased military involvement.
One Bush policy Obama will not continue is the forceful eradication of poppy fields. Many factors argue in favor of this change. Eradication eroded Afghan trust in the United States, the American public viewed it as cruelly destroying the livelihoods of vulnerable farmers, and, as Felbab-Brown noted, the eradication programs were “ineffective and unsustainable.” While Schweich admitted that the programs were run ineffectively, he insisted, “Unless there’s a downside to farmers, unless they know there’s a threat, they will keep planting poppies.” Yet according to U.N. surveys, less than four percent of the opium crop was eradicated, in part because very few of the provincial governors permitted eradication. Because it was not an integral factor in the recently noted improvements, the end of eradication programs is not likely to affect the fall in opium production.
Achieving Sustainable Success
Due to recent successes, the United States now has an opportunity to gain control of the opium trade in Afghanistan. This will require a two-part strategy. First, the U.S. must help to introduce viable alternative crops. Currently, provincial governors and U.S. policy makers are promoting wheat; as Lt. Col. Wright remarked, “There have been significant increases in wheat and grains cultivation.” However, Felbab-Brown is critical of the emphasis on wheat, stating that the initiative is “economically unsustainable,” and that “most farmers have only switched to wheat out of fear of rising prices.” A viable agricultural economy for Afghan farmers will rely on a diverse range of crops, not just wheat, and thus requires access to an array commodity markets.  Market development, a successful strategy during the Bush administration, will be key to the success of alternative agriculture.
Second, the U.S. must devise successful interdiction policies. Current levels of security forces are insufficient, highlighted by General Stanley McChrystal’s recently leaked report citing the need for additional troops in Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces should not function only to disrupt the opium trade, but also to strengthen Afghanistan’s security forces. According to Lt. Col. Wright, one current focus is the “development of the Afghan national security forces, both the national police and army, to enforce national laws.” These Afghan national security forces must be trained to act with sufficient independence from local government, since corrupt governors often take bribes to protect poppy fields and farmers. Stronger law enforcement by a well-trained Afghan security force, paired with the development of lucrative alternative crop markets, will enhance the quality of life for Afghan farmers, while also reducing the production of opium.