Executing the Obama Doctrine

“The doctrine is we will engage, but we preserve all our capabilities.” – President Barack Obama.
President Obama has maintained that the recent nuclear deal with Iran is indeed a good deal for the United States, and for now, that seems to be the case. The so-called “Obama Doctrine” for U.S.-Iran negotiations will ensure that the United States calls the shots in reaching and implementing an agreement. The preliminary agreement from the talks calls for a significant reduction in Iran’s enriched uranium and its enrichment capabilities in locations such as Fordow and Arak, in exchange for the lifting of nuclear-related economic sanctions on Iran. Yet, while the United States has engaged in a reciprocation of concessions, it has currently preserved the capability to decide exactly how and when these sanctions will be lifted. Herein lies the Americans’ critical leverage over their Iranian counterparts.
Since the late 90’s, the United States, followed by the EU and several other countries, have imposed economic sanctions on Iran in attempts to halt the country’s nuclear program. While the effectiveness of these measures remains controversial, it is clear that the sanctions have had a suffocating effect on the Iranian economy. Iran’s financial and oil sectors in particular have taken heavy hits, and the country has since suffered a huge drop in exports, GDP, revenue, and currency valuation. In this way, America and EU have effectively strung an economic noose around Iran with their sanctions. C.I.A. Director John Brennan claims that it was the desire to escape the economic noose that drove Iran to consider a deal in the first place.
But the United States and its allies have no intentions of loosening this noose anytime soon. In order to not only engage Iran in further talks but also preserve the framework agreement, the United States will use sanctions to its advantage. At first glance, the current nuclear deal seems to consist of an equal exchange of concessions, with one side conceding its enrichment capabilities and the other conceding its sanctioning power. Iran, however, must first make its concessions in order to benefit at all from the deal. Iran must neutralize its nuclear threats before Obama agrees to neutralize the economic threat on Iran. In this scenario, Iran would have to comply with all aspects of the nuclear agreement in order to gain any breathing room. Meanwhile, a worst case scenario from the American perspective would simply be a return to sanctioning a hostile Iran, should the deal go south.
Moreover, the fact that this nuclear agreement will span 10 to 15 years gives the United States leeway to tailor a de-sanctioning policy to suit its and its allies’ goals—to place even more pressure on Iran for nuclear disarmament and to subject its nuclear facilities to greater international scrutiny. As Obama puts it, the United States will “preserve the ability to snap back those sanctions if there is a violation.” If this were to happen, Iran would face international backlash, while the White House would remain relatively unscathed.
In other words, Iran has come out of this deal as the only party who must take concrete actions—such as cutting back on centrifuges and converting nuclear facilities. In contrast, plans for eliminating sanctions are, at this point, far from concrete. Toward the sanctions component of the agreement, the two sides have understandably different hopes in mind. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is aware of both the Americans’ advantage and the economic noose in which his country is operating and has called for immediate sanction relief. Obama, of course, is not willing to lift sanctions until Iran delivers on its commitments, as is in line with his doctrine to preserve the American advantage when going forward with this nuclear deal. For now, he still maintains the upper hand.