On February 26, Egypt’s most powerful man, Minister of Defense and Field Marshal Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, declared that he would not run for president, according to a Reuters-documented government source. After months of speculation, the Egyptian people, weathered by three years of sporadic revolutionary activity and starved of much-needed economic and political change, were looking to Al-Sisi’s presidential run as a twinkling hope for Egypt’s return to a Nasserist golden age. Chants of Al-Sisi’s name and posters plastered across stores and houses with his face invigorated protest-weary citizens with expectations of a stable Egypt, and military anthems echoed through Cairo’s narrow streets. That patriotism has gradually dulled in the face of increasing doubt in Al-Sisi’s intentions to run for the country’s top post, and now, with the government’s recent announcement, it is completely muted.
Egyptian citizens are only somewhat caught off guard, despite their increasing and potentially destabilizing frustration. Many looked to the recent promotion of Al-Sisi to the rank of field marshal, the highest military honor in Egypt, as a precursor for his retirement from the military and a first step in his path to fill the military-political void left by Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011. But with more frequent worker strikes and an escalating security situation, the military and its advisors planning to take the helm have grown increasingly concerned with their slimming chances of political survival in Egypt’s tumultuous atmosphere.
To top it off, February has seen a variety of symptoms of Egypt’s crumbling security apparatus: a terrorist bomb, allegedly placed by Sinai extremist faction Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, struck a tourist bus in the Sinai Peninsula, killing four and injuring fourteen more. The growing threat of insurgency is further whetted by the government’s overtly cruel punishments: on February 26 an Egyptian criminal court sentenced 26 people to death for founding and leading a “terror group” aimed at activities in Sinai and the Suez Canal. With no other options left to take, these hardline actions may seem appropriate for maintaining public order, but only serve to fan the flames of insecurity and paranoia.
But the problem isn’t just one of arms and arrests—workers’ strikes that began in the beginning of the year have only increased in size and vigor, with strikers demanding Egypt’s ministers set a minimum income. An interminable sit-in staged by the nascent Socialist Popular Alliance Party alongside Cairo’s administrative security headquarters in the neighborhood of Attaba is a constant reminder of the interim government’s failure to meet workers’ cries for social and economic rights. Given skyrocketing food prices, more and more citizens have slipped under the poverty line, looking to the government to pull them back up.
Just another scapegoat
Amidst a volatile mix of civilian frustration and tension, the interim cabinet was faced with an ultimatum: either create substantive policies adjusting for the government’s clear legislative gaps, or give up entirely. Under the guise of having fulfilled their duty and of handing the political baton to a more permanent government, the ministerial council chose the latter of the two options. On February 24, Egypt’s entire cabinet, led by interim Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi, suddenly resigned, giving no explanation to the cameras and reporters crowded outside the the group’s headquarters. The apparent cop-out left patriotic newscasters—who had been touting Al-Sisi’s run since previous president Morsi’s fall—unfazed in the claim that the transitional “road map” was completed and that a new power will soon emerge to lead Egypt to greatness.
But Al-Sisi’s intentions, despite chaotic political commentary and largely wishful thinking, are enigmas in themselves. Whether the military general, who could have easily taken the presidency, will continue Egypt’s dynasty of strong-armed rulers remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: given Egypt’s current situation and its ominous forecast, Al-Sisi, president or not, will be placed in an unstable position, in which he will be expected to fix Egypt’s insurmountably troubling situation.
Public figures who have seemingly stepped aside for Al-Sisi’s straight shot to power have perhaps predicted this outcome, and they may be waiting for the military general to become the angry citizens’ next scapegoat in the revolutionary process. Others supporting Al-Sisi’s rule may intend that he take the bullet: endorsements from high-ranking government and military officials such as Prime Minister Beblawi, as well as political leaders including National Salvation Front’s Hamdeen Sabahi, abound as people continue to expound on Al-Sisi’s competence and charisma. Even the normally contentious el-Wafd party foresees this outcome, with its leader, Sayed El-Badawi, adding his stamp of approval to Al-Sisi’s potential presidential ticket. The unanimous political support of a single man, unprecedented since Nasser took power in 1952, is more suspicious than it is indicative of supposed unity and political agreement, especially as it follows a revolution that has polarized parties of all orientations.
At this point, however, the support seems more like a collective death sentence to the fervid guillotine that has decapitated two regimes in the last three years. Egypt’s most powerful man may face an ultimatum himself: either take the presidency by the horns and hope he is not thrown off, or cope with overwhelming disappointment that may paint his legacy that of a coward.
© 2024 Harvard Political Review. All rights reserved.