A closer look at shifting power dynamics in Iran
The election crisis in Iran this summer riveted the world with scenes of dramatic demonstrations and a brutal crackdown that left hundreds dead. But the aftermath of the elections marked a subtle shift in the regime’s power structure: the ascent of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a central political force. Particularly since 2005, when former Guardsman and current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was first elected, the hard-line group has achieved extensive influence over the state’s media, politics, economy, and national security strategy.
Moving Beyond the Military
The Revolutionary Guard was created by Ayatollah Khomeini as an elite military force in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but the corps grew in size and influence during Iran’s long war with Iraq in the 1980s. Today, with 130,000 members, control over the feared Basij militia, and military bases throughout the country, the Guard dominates the Iranian security establishment and continues to expand its power.
“The Guard is deeply embedded in economic and political matters,” said Michael Singh, fellow at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, in an interview with the HPR. A 2008 RAND study called the Guard “an expansive socio-political-economic conglomerate,” whose influence “extends into virtually every corner of Iranian political life and society.” Members of the IRGC possess a majority of Iran’s oil and gas contracts, control their own ports, and head the defense, oil, and interior ministries.
This “quiet coup,” as Time recently termed it, was capped off by the post-election appointment of Guardsman Haidar Moslehi as minister of intelligence, long a check on the IRGC’s power. Patrick Clawson, deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted in an interview with the HPR that the Guard recently acquired a controlling stake in the state telecommunications company. They also have considerable sway over the country’s missile and nuclear programs through key positions on the Supreme National Security Council.
A Rolling Coup?
The rise of this elite corps at the expense of Iran’s mullahs may signify the consolidation of a new, post-revolutionary balance of military and theocratic power. Although the IRGC still officially answers to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini, the relationship is one of careful interdependence. Jim Phillips, senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Heritage Foundation, told the HPR that the Supreme Leader is “now more dependent on the Guard than ever before.” Khameini relies on the Guard for support against rivals, especially reformist leaders such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s main challenger in the presidential election. The Guard in turn depends on Khameini to sanctify their mounting economic and political influence.
Kim Holmes, vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the Heritage Foundation, told the HPR that the Supreme Leader “has little support from the other clerics, who see him as a mediocre Islamic scholar, a poor politician, and a weak leader.” Some experts wonder whether he eventually will be held hostage to the Guard’s growing authority. “More and more,” said Clawson, “the Guard insists that it has a voice on issues and one could accurately describe what is happening as a ‘rolling coup.’” F. Gregory Gause, professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, agreed. “Before the election one would have said the Supreme Leader was the dominant force, but now it’s open to question.”
Toeing the Hard Line
The Revolutionary Guard’s wide influence and hard-line stance may make the Iranian regime less likely to compromise with perceived foes, at home or abroad. Clawson explained, “The Guard takes seriously its constitutionally mandated role of protectors and exporters of the revolution. They are insular risk-takers and less worldly than the cautious Ayatollahs.” The Guard has well-known ties to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Reformist clerics such as former president Mohammed Khatami, who led calls for U.S.-Iranian dialogue, find themselves marginalized as their supporters are intimidated and they are blocked from positions of power.
For the United States, the IRGC represents a potentially dangerous mix of elements: a strong urge for power, hatred of the West, support for terrorism, and nuclear ambitions. Direct U.S. intervention in Iranian politics is almost certain to be counterproductive. But if the Guard’s vast commercial interests have tempered its fanaticism, measures such as economic sanctions may be able to induce cooperation. Ultimately, understanding the regime and its future will require more attention to the repressive apparatus that is increasingly at its center.
