I agree with the Zoey’s points about Iran’s incentives to accept American diplomatic outreach. But I would take her conclusion further. It wasn’t just Bush’s failure to be “attuned to geopolitical realities” that prevented this sort of progress; it was his failure, on a deeper level, to respect or conceptualize properly the purpose of diplomacy generally.
It’s a fitting occasion to remember Bush’s remarks to the Israeli parliament last spring:
Some seem to believe we should negotiate with terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along.
That would be foolish! But of course that’s not the purpose of diplomacy. I’m sure that others have articulated this better than I can, but it bears repeating. Negotiation is not about contriving an “ingenious argument” that will “persuade” our foes to put down their weapons. Negotiation is about advancing national goals by aligning them with the incentive structures of the other negotiating partner.
Here’s a thought experiment. Say Iran’s desire for nuclear capabilities is a product of (1) wanting to deterring an American attack and (2) wanting to assert greater regional leadership. On the other hand, America’s fear is a product of our strong interests in (1) halting Iran’s nuclear program and (2) ending its hostility towards Israel.
In this scenario, both nations’ interests are aligned. One bargain would be that Iran ceases its enrichment program and commits to a policy of neutrality towards Israel; and in exchange, the United States provides security guarantees and recognizes Iran’s regional leadership, including working to get it admitted into the WTO. Both nations’ interests, initially aligned, are now relatively satisfied.
Negotiation, in this sense, is a form of commerce. Two parties exchange goods (money, security, land, guarantees or other things) and both perceive that the transaction is to its benefit, the result being positive sum. That’s the proper purpose of negotiaton: not to use words like bludgeons or to invent persuasive arguments; it’s about finding overlapping interests, and pursuing them agressively.
Of course this is all rather simplified and abstract; whether an agreement with Iran can be nailed down will depend on finding an intersection between the perceived interests of multiple regional players, each with varying leverage, stakes, political limitations and so on.
But it’s not a “foolish delusion” to think that such an agreement can be reached. And if can be — let this be said clearly — the benefits would be greater and more permanent than those gained by military action, and the costs would be infinitely lower. Commerce benefits both parties. Diplomats, like other merchants exchanging goods, desire peace.
