Nukes for Non-State Actors

How globalization is a game-changer for nuclear security

“Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013,” the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism reported in December 2008. The Commission warned the Obama administration that, despite the post-9/11 efforts to deter a nuclear attack, the threat is, as former Senator Sam Nunn testified, “growing, not receding.”
This rising threat cannot be explained in the same terms as the nuclear threat of decades past, when nuclear security policy rightly focused on arms control treaties with key nuclear states, or when the deterrent effect of mutually assured destruction seemed enough to guarantee safety from nuclear attack. Globalization has changed the game; multilateralism, though still essential, is no longer sufficient. Fighting nuclear terrorism in this age requires a much more proactive approach than ratifying treaties, as the most likely aggressors are not rational, state actors, but extremist, non-state actors whose sources for information, weapons, and materials are plentiful.

Globalization and the Rise of Non-State Actors
An increase in the influence of non-state actors such as terrorist organizations, insurgencies, and drug-trafficking organizations is a well-documented feature of globalization. As Phil Williams points out in a recent article for the International Relations and Security Network, non-state actors benefit on the whole from the consequences of globalization, including the decreasing capacity of states to manage economic affairs and the increasing ease with which members of non-state organizations can build transnational networks and raise funds.
Weak states serve as havens for non-state actors who would prefer to operate under the radar. Al-Qaeda, for example, with its transnational network of terrorists and supporters, has its nerve center in the ungoverned space between Pakistan and Afghanistan and operates virtually unfettered by national or international authority.
When Nukes Get Away
New geopolitical realities have raised the stakes of the nuclear game. Joseph Nye, professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and former member of the National Security Council’s Group on Nonproliferation, informed the HPR that, “When I was in charge of non-proliferation policy in the Carter Administration in the 1970s, we were already concerned about nuclear materials falling into the hands of non-state actors, but the increase in the number of countries with fissionable materials… has made that an even greater concern.” Nine countries have nuclear weapons capabilities, but many more have unsecured nuclear facilities where waste products might be readily attained. The aggregate risk of nuclear attack must include the possibility of weapons use by both state and non-state actors and the possibility that weapons technology and materials could be stolen, purchased, built, and transported almost anywhere in the world. From whose hands is a nuclear weapon most likely to escape?
While the threat is diffuse, experts hone in on two key states: Pakistan and Russia. “In Pakistan, it’s raining nuclear weapons,” Kosta Tsipis, former director of MIT’s Program in Science and Technology for International Security, told the HPR. At the intersection of terrorist activity and nuclear proliferation, Pakistan presents a tremendous risk. Russia also merits attention with its quantities of “loose nukes” and unsecured nuclear material as well as its history of corruption and attempted nuclear theft. Tsipis commented that North Korea, though also a threat, “is possible to fix.” He suggested that the United States should make treaties agreeing to the principle of “we’ll give you what you want, but we want to have absolute control over where your nuclear material is.”
Asked which non-state actor is most likely to achieve nuclear capabilities, United States Lt. General Robert Gard, Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, told the HPR, “Though it’s hard to say which terrorist organization would be the cleverest, I’d bet on Al-Qaeda or an organization closely associated with it.” John Isaacs, the Executive Director of the Center, concurred in his comments to the HPR: “I fear that [Al-Qaeda has] the network, the resources, the imagination and the logistic ability to obtain a nuclear weapon.” This situation is not difficult to predict.
Obama’s Imperatives
With the changing face of the nuclear threat comes the need for new tactics. Arms control activists have reason to believe that the new presidential administration recognizes the need for this shift. “It is very clear from [Obama’s] statements that arms control will no longer be a dirty word,” Lt. General Gard noted “after all, one can achieve national security objectives as readily by international cooperation and arms control measures as by building weapons.”
The most recent report of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation provides President Obama with three imperatives to dramatically lessen the risk of nuclear terrorism: first, to set a new direction in our own weapons policy, leading the world towards arms reduction; second, to secure all vulnerable fissile material in his first term, satisfying a campaign pledge; and third, to seek ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. The Center also recommends pursuing further cooperation among intelligence agencies around the world that seek to reduce the global threat of attack.
Pursuing these imperatives requires sufficient political will and funds. Obama has already encountered resistance in his attempt to take weapons off “hair-trigger alert,” and we have yet to see how Congress will respond to the complete agenda, especially given the costly nature of securing material abroad on a tight federal budget. If they are carried out, however, these initiatives will constitute a comprehensive approach that would send a long-awaited message to the arms control community. Isaacs emphasized that “nothing is inevitable in Washington, D.C.” but remains “cautiously optimistic” about the future.
Though a nuclear weapon has not been detonated offensively since 1945 and the ubiquitous atomic bomb drills of the height of the Cold War now seem like distant history, the rise of non-state actors and the global accessibility of nuclear materials and technology are reason to believe that the genuine threat of a nuclear attack is not behind us. Instead, this threat is a fearsome reality that must be met with clear thinking and decisive action. President Obama seems to understand the need for a multilayered approach that involves leading the world by example while aggressively working to secure materials in vulnerable areas. Only by pursuing both these courses of action with conviction and an understanding of the truly global nature of the problem can we work to prevent the terrible prospect of a non-state actor armed with a nuclear weapon.