“For words and discussion are not a substitute for strength—they are an instrument for the translation of strength into survival and peace.”
– John F. Kennedy, June 14, 1960
Updated: September 22, 2015, at 2:41 p.m.
On June 10, 1963, President John F. Kennedy delivered a commencement address at American University on the subject of world peace. Hailed by many commentators as symbolic of the supposed détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, his remarks that sunny Monday in June live in perpetual memory to those of us committed to what Kennedy acutely described as “not merely peace in our time, but peace for all time.”
Unfortunately, however, the real history of Kennedy’s peace strategy and foreign policy has now been distorted—or conveniently forgotten—by many political observers attempting to compare the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enacted in 1963 to the Obama administration’s Iran deal. Though Kennedy was denied a post-presidency, and thus the ability to explain and defend his actions, his foreign policy should be remembered for what it was: complex yet candid, strong yet cooperative, and practically realist yet philosophically idealist. An accurate account of JFK’s foreign policy makes the contrasting strategies for peace between Presidents Kennedy and Obama clear.
Strength of Might
Only 16 days after uttering those conciliatory words at American University, and eight months after the world came to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962, Kennedy combatively asserted, “There are some who say in Europe and elsewhere we can work with the Communists. Let them come to Berlin!”
Like the man himself, Kennedy’s strategy for peace can appear puzzling, even contradictory at times. To him, “a pause in the Cold War was not a lasting peace–and a détente did not equal disarmament” and “there was nothing inconsistent with signing an atmospheric nuclear test ban, on the one hand, and testing underground on the other.”
Not everyone thought this way. Richard Nixon, for example, believed that an easing in relations between two adversaries meant a reduction in arms. But not Kennedy. Immersed in Churchillian thought from the time he could read, JFK held the British prime minister’s view that “we should rearm in order to parley.” Strength of might would bring about talks of peace and disarmament, but only in that order.
During the three short years of his presidency, Kennedy, through his strength-of-might policy, approved a failed CIA Cuban coup; presided over increased American involvement in Vietnam and Laos; reluctantly broke the 1958 Eisenhower moratorium on nuclear-testing; dramatically increased both military funds and personnel; initiated a massive arms increase to close the U.S.-Soviet “missile gap”; and exercised a muscular foreign policy that later became the basis for the Reagan administration’s “peace through strength” mantra.
Most consequentially, he successfully steered the nation through the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and he achieved the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union, which paved the way for Nixon’s later arms control agreements and closer relations between the two hegemonies.
His strategy for peace was a strategy of military strength, of lucid and direct communication with foes and friends alike, of empathy and reason, and ultimately of enduring commitment to the pledge that forever marked his inauguration speech: “to assure the survival and success of liberty.”
Weakness at the Table
Suffice to say, Kennedy’s foreign policy is radically different than that of the current administration. Above all else, Kennedy sought to negotiate from a position of strength. President Obama, by contrast, negotiates from a position of self-inflicted weakness.
First, on the eastern front, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and Crimea eerily harkens back to Cold War-era norms. China’s exploration in the South China Seas violates the territorial integrity of our allies in Japan and Taiwan, and its efforts towards becoming a military world power poses immense threats to the 21st-century world order. In response to these geopolitical challenges, the Obama administration has failed to articulate, much less implement, a cohesive strategy to check the aggression of these two superpowers.
Second, after the monumental mistake in 2011 to remove all American troops from Iraq, acronymic terrorist organizations, most notably ISIS, have filled the gap left by an imprudent withdrawal. Not only has this reversed gains—paid for by significant American blood and resources—made in the last decade by both American and NATO forces, it has created a new safe haven for terrorists to plot attacks against the West. It seems Obama fiddled while Iraq burned.
Last, in Syria, the Obama administration has refused to genuinely lead the rebels in the ongoing civil war, or take any steps to address the larger issue of proxy warfare as Syria continues to spiral out of control and hundreds of thousands of refugees flee to Europe. The brutal Assad regime, reported to be responsible for around 70 percent of civilian deaths since 2011, is still in power after repeated instances of state-sponsored chemical and biological warfare, which crossed Obama’s arbitrary red line to find no consequences on the other side.
Now that our adversaries know that this administration does not mean what it says, it is little wonder that Assad’s allies in Tehran have secured a favorable deal on its nuclear program with a President unwilling to risk confrontation.
Consequently, the merits of the Iran deal speak for themselves: an estimated $100 billion in sanctions relief, which may be allocated to terrorist proxies Hezbollah and Hamas; a lift of the UN conventional arms embargo on Iran, which contradicts the President’s claim that we would be in the same position to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program in the future as we are today; a concession allowing Iran to keep a limited amount of enriched uranium; “where necessary, when necessary” international inspections—with a 24-day waiting period—rather than the original demand of “anytime, anywhere” inspections; and a promise to protect the Iranian nuclear program from “sabotage” by other parties, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Those who claim that there is no alternative to the Iran deal now that it has been struck may well be correct. But it did not have to be this way. Kennedy demonstrates that when negotiating with a “ruthless, Godless tyranny” like Soviet Communism, or, in this case, the hostile regime in Tehran, already responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, efforts to achieve peace must not turn into appeasement, yet nor should peace be deemed unattainable. The strategy for peace must be strength at the negotiating table, not an implicit signaling to adversaries that the military option is off the table.
Unflinching Accountability
Nevertheless, the past is the past. Because the Iran deal will most likely become a reality, Kennedy’s lesson for this President now is to unflinchingly hold Iran accountable. Any violations of this accord must be recorded clearly for the world and posterity to see. Obama cannot be afraid to terminate the agreement in the likely case that the Iranians fight off inspectors and attempt to continue work on their already sophisticated nuclear program.
It is true that today’s geopolitical environment appears to be increasingly perilous. And Obama, to be sure, has fervently sought to achieve peace in the volatile regions of the Middle East and North Africa. But peace at what cost?
Kennedy understood that defending liberty caused many to bear painstaking burdens, often paid for through the lives of brave Americans. His brother, Joseph Jr., died fighting against Nazism, which might explain Kennedy’s passionate statement that “there can be no compromise with communism or any other ‘ism’ which is contrary to the rights of freedom-loving peoples.”
We must remember the admonitions of President Kennedy. And we must remember that the consequences of a bad deal, for the United States and the world, are the same now as they were then. Now, as then, “any misjudgment on either side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several hours than has been wrought in all the wars of human history.”
Those comparing the Iran deal today to Kennedy’s Soviet deal in 1963—including Obama himself by choosing to give his peace speech at American University—would do well to remember the actions, policies and rhetoric of a man whose name they so often invoke. They would do well to remember his true strategy for peace.
Correction, September 22, 2015: An earlier version of this article stated that Joseph Kennedy, Jr. died in the Pacific Theater of World War II, and that the Obama administration failed to arm the Syrian rebels. Kennedy died fighting in Europe, and Obama has armed certain rebel groups in Syria.
Image Credits: Abbie Rowe/Wikimedia Commons, Cecil Stoughton/Flickr
