On October 23, the New York Times published a minor story with a concerning focus: the potential use of chlorine gas by ISIS. More than two months later, no confirmation or denial has emerged from the investigation about ISIS’ purported use of chemical weapons. Alarm bells have not been raised, although ISIS likely has obtained chemical weapons from storage facilities in either Iraq or Syria, posing a danger far greater than this small news story suggests. Still, most attention remains focused on the Assad regime; just consider the immense media attention received by a recent report re-affirming the certainty of Assad’s chemical weapons use. Chemical weapons may be in the hands of non-state actors. This possibility is becoming an existential threat that the international community and American media must address more urgently.
If ISIS possesses chemical weapons, their use presents a new kind of danger that we have yet to grapple with. Since World War I and World War II international bodies have closely monitored these weapons. They have been successfully contained thus far by the threat of international reprisal and by the extensive international laws restricting their use; formal states employed chemical weapons in only a few cases in the last fifty years. Excluding the American use of Agent Orange in Vietnam and the Assad government’s current use, almost all of these cases of chemical weapons usage were at the hands of the Iraqi government in the 80s, first against Iran, then again against Kurds in Halbaja in Northern Iraq.
That the Sunni extremists of ISIS may once again be attacking Kurds with chemical weapons is certainly a disturbing echo of what happened in 1986. More importantly, this time around, an international response cannot be effective in containing these weapons. Unlike the Iraqi or Syrian government, ISIS cannot be stopped by threats of sanctions or airstrikes. The logic is the same as with mutually assured destruction; extremist groups simply do not operate under the same terms of engagement as traditional and rational states. They have no citizens or borders, and so fear of a retaliatory attack cannot be used as a preventative measure. When we are at war against groups like ISIS, we cannot expect to prevent these attacks.
Just a few months ago the world was up in arms over Obama’s bold declaration of a “red line” in Syria. Indeed, Americans already fear state use of chemical agents, because we have well-documented evidence of the horrible destruction they can wreak. Take the 1,400 dead after a single attack outside of Damascus last December. If state possession of chemical weapons worries us, though, then the possibility of non-state actors using them should be far more concerning. This fear might be mitigated if the reports were at all implausible, far-fetched, or specious. However, this is far from the case. After the attack this October in Iraq, a cloud of yellow gas hung over the area. Combined with the reports of doctors who treated those affected, that gas cloud makes chemical weapons use seem highly probable. Even more convincingly, there have now been unconfirmed reports that an ISIS attack on Christmas Day in Anbar province also involved chemical gas.
Moreover, we know where ISIS may have obtained these weapons. Even before ISIS launched an attack, media outlets reported the possibility that ISIS had stolen weapons from old Iraqi stockpiles. The State Department then confirmed that ISIS seized this weapons facility, although they called the weapons stored there unusable. Indeed, those stockpiles and their cleanup were supposedly directly overseen by the United Nations and American agencies. The weapons were deemed too greatly damaged to be used. While it is true that the location was mostly destroyed, however, it is important to note that a CIA report did warn that some chemical weapons might have remained at the facility. Although the contents of the facility’s bunkers were declared to the United Nations, no international agency ever actually confirmed what was stored there. Thus, despite State Department denials, these very weapons—which international agencies supposedly already removed from Iraq—might be enabling ISIS’ current attacks. Indeed, bodies started to show up with signs of chemical weapons use just a month after the facility was seized. If ISIS has obtained weapons from these stockpiles, as is suspected, it does not only mean that citizens across the globe are in danger because of the now-enhanced potency of their weapons. It also means that international oversight agencies are partially responsible.
Even if ISIS does not yet have chemical weapons, or if it has few, there is still a high potential for it to obtain chemical weapons in the future. There are still a large number of remaining chemical weapons facilities which ISIS could go on to claim if its military campaign continues to be successful. Although all of Iraq’s chemical weapons facilities were captured and disabled during the U.S. invasion, like with the facility seized this summer, oversight was imperfect and intelligence is spotty. Moreover, if ISIS is able to observe and study old and unusable weapons, or employ old facilities to manufacture weapons, chemical attacks could become a more frequent reality. Given that ISIS is also growing its influence in Syria—and there are certainly many confirmed chemical weapons facilities in that country—the possibility of proliferation only increases. Already, there have been confirmed reports of chemical agent use in areas where ISIS is fighting, even if the U.S. government has thus far attributed those attacks to the Assad regime.
On the other hand, it is not impossible for an extremist group to develop these weapons themselves. In 1995, a radical Japanese terrorist group called Aum Shinrikyo released Sarin gas into the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 and forcing 6,000 more into the hospital. The members of the organization made these weapons themselves. Studies of the Japanese case demonstrate that the ingredients necessary for making chemical weapons are available to underground extremist organizations. After extensive interviews with those inside of Aum, it became clear to researchers that the group’s motivation to use chemical weapons came from both a desire to cause mass terror and from the goal of being new, different, and cutting-edge. When considering ISIS, a young terrorist organization looking to carve a place for itself apart from Al Qaeda, there certainly seems to be strong incentive for obtaining and using such weapons, even if their development proves complicated.
Although much fear and speculation has often surrounded potential terrorist use of biological weapons, Aum found it far easier to develop chemical agents, like sarin gas. For them, biological weapons were much more difficult to cultivate and create in the unstable environments in which most non-state actors operate. Still, Aum’s development of chemical weapons was slow; five years elapsed before the group successfully developed a weapon, and even then, they only deployed it once. Despite many other attempted attacks after 1995, no one died at the hands of their weapons again. Similarly, all other attempts to use these weapons have failed. Should other non-state actors try to develop chemical weapons on their own, they will also likely fail many times before they succeed in developing such weapons. However, the potential for delay and low success rates must not breed complacency. Where other groups failed, ISIS is likely to succeed. Aum was not an international organization and had no sway over any government; rather, it was politically marginal. Organized and experienced groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS will have a far easier time coordinating weapons development after years of fighting, hiding, intelligence gathering, and networking. They can far more easily obtain the needed labor from local populations and needed supplies from other groups or governments. That al-Qaeda may have already developed chemical weapons once, as evidenced by photos of dogs who appeared to have died by sarin gas in 2003, points to this unique strength.
The international community must pay more attention to chemical weapons used not only by the Assad regime, but also by actors who cannot be persuaded by sanctions and negotiations. International laws have managed to mostly control these weapons on the world stage. But where the law’s reach ends, these weapons become far more potent. Much like with WMDs, should extremist groups gain more access to chemical agents, a dramatic and dangerous shift in modern warfare could occur. There is a real chance that ISIS already has these weapons, and an even greater chance that they could be stolen or developed in the near future. This possibility deserves more than a brief footnote on the news ticker.
Photo credits: Wikimedia, U.S. Government
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