On the 16th of February 2011, protests in Benghazi, Libya erupted after the arrest of a civil rights activist and critic of Muammar Gaddafi. By the 20th, the conflict had spread to Tripoli, the country’s capital. Since then, the country has been under siege by opposition groups, and the reality of each side’s progress has been ambiguous. On March 17th, the United Nations passed Resolution 1973 which states the members of the UN are able “to take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamhariya, including Benghazi, while excluding an occupation force.” This UN Resolution allowed NATO to implement a no-fly zone over Libya, led initially by the United States Air Force. On March 31st, NATO took complete control of the no-fly zone.
Since then, major battles at Ajdabiya, Benghazi, and Misrata, as well as many other cities, have taken place. The Libyan crisis has transformed itself into a stalemate since the bulk of the rebel forces lacks both leadership and communication, preventing them from consolidating their gains and coordinating their actions.
While at first, President Obama seemed to drag his feet in deciding to intervene in the Libya crisis, on March 28th, in his speech at the National Defense University, Obama justified the U.S. role in the intervention. He announced that the United States would intervene to stop “brutal repression” and a massacre of civilians by pro-Gaddafi forces, as well as a looming humanitarian crisis. On March 20th, three days after the UN approval of the no-fly zone in Libya, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated the U.S. will not have a “preeminent role” in the coalition that will maintain a no-fly zone over Libya, and expects to turn over “primary responsibility” for the mission to others within days.
President Obama argues that legitimacy is added to the fight against Gaddafi when a broad coalition of states, including European and Arab countries, takes action. He states, “this is precisely how the international community should work […] as more nations bear both the responsibility and the cost of enforcing international law.” However, because of US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the president is wary of involving ground forces in Libya, and so far has only promised to take part in a no-fly zone.
The Obama administration’s restrained involvement in Libya is due to the history of U.S. foreign interventions, significant budget constraints and the upcoming 2012 elections. It is interesting to note that the United States has had a long history of foreign interventions that led to mixed results. Beginning with the Korean War all the way up to today’s Iraq War, it has been a rocky road that has often ended with dissatisfaction both at home and abroad, with perhaps the first Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo and some others as exceptions. The long term effects of most foreign interventions are clear, from a still divided Korea to an unhealthy Haiti to an unstable Central America to continued conflict in Iraq. Many would argue that the U.S. should have learned its lesson after the Vietnam War – foreign interventions are complex and need to be considered with great care. This heavy history seems to have finally sunk in to the current American foreign policy. The Obama administration’s treatment of the civil war in Libya suggests, perhaps, that we can learn. This strategic shift signals a greater respect for the international community and a commitment to democratic ideals.
While historical precedent may not be enough of a deterrent, perhaps we can look to current budget constraints for an explanation of the restrained US involvement. One of the central preoccupations of US domestic policy debate has been the budget. Both parties are looking to cut spending, and with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq costing an estimated $1.2 trillion, neither the government nor the American public are looking for intensified involvement abroad. In addition, there is little room to expand the US budget in order to fund another direct military intervention. These fiscal constraints are yet another reason that helps explain the limited US role in NATO’s intervention.
Finally, the upcoming 2012 elections could also help explain the decision for the US to have a restrained role in the intervention. A multilateral approach to the Libyan crisis supports the President in two significant ways: it allows him to maintain the image of a humanist and gives him political clout for the elections. He maintains his image as the President who champions the values of the Nobel Peace Prize. At the same time, this strategic retreat contrasts the President with potential conservative opponents as the 2012 elections approach. Furthermore, the public’s reaction to the intervention provides yet another strong argument against unilateralism. A March 21st Gallup Poll found that although a majority of Americans who had an opinion approve of the intervention, the approval rate stands at a meager 47%, the lowest level of support given to any US military action since the 1983 invasion of Grenada. With such mixed public support, maintaining American preeminence in Libya would not be politically wise for the Obama administration.
In keeping with all of these facts, the choice between unilateral leadership by the United States and a unified effort of a multinational coalition is not a simple or easy one. While the Bush-era wars in the Middle East have proven to the American people, as well as to the world at large, that unilateralism can lead to prolonged conflicts with no support or guarantee of success, it is impossible to ignore the fact that multilateralism has its own history of failures to answer for, such as the cases of Somalia and Rwanda. Multilateral efforts tend to work under ambiguous objectives and strategies so that they can be acceptable to every state, a problem not encountered in unilateralism. This comes as a byproduct of the reality that each country enters a conflict with its own biases, interests, and value systems. If the US chooses equal footing among other nations, then coordination among those states becomes a bureaucratic nightmare that could greatly protract any action, affecting long-term outcomes and costs. We cannot, however, ignore the costs of U.S. direct military intervention in Libya. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have left more than the nation’s wallet empty; morale and moral standing have both experienced a blow. Can U.S. troops maintain the psychological energy to begin leading the offensive in a third country so soon after Iraq? If the U.S. should fail, will we have enough political clout to compete with China? These considerations make the situation in Libya a very difficult one to navigate, and are complicated by Qadaffi’s stubborn refusal to back down.
In the end, the United States has decided to take a supporting role in Libya. While the reasons for this are many, the implications are complex. In the immediate future, we can expect to see Great Britain and France assume a more kinetic role in NATO operations, at least in situations where the United States is not willing to take the lead, such as in Libya. By assuming leadership roles within NATO and the enforcement of the UN no-fly zone, these two nations will begin to step further into the spotlight as interventionist powers. France is already showing its newfound interventionist role in the Ivory Coast with its pivotal role in the overthrow of Gbagbo. Great Britain has already declared its intention to send military advisors into Libya to assist the rebel forces if it becomes necessary. It will be interesting to watch these two nations’ foreign policies evolve over the coming decades to see if they will continue to take on a stronger role within NATO instead of relying upon the United States to carry out NATO actions on their behalf. Despite the US’s decision to assume a supporting role in Libya, it is still considered the world’s strongest power. The question is: will we see the United States pursue a leading role in multilateral efforts as history shows, or take on a supporting role more often?
The United States is becoming more dynamic in its multilateral efforts on the international scene. However, if a situation arises when it must become the tip of an international spear, it will not shy away from such a commitment. While the United States’ armed forces are learning from their current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they still hold a unique role as the world’s most professional and capable military. The US has come to understand that in order to intervene globally, it must secure international support and cannot be the sole actor on the ground, in the air or at sea. The US decision not to be a leading member of the NATO coalition in Libya could foreshadow a significant shift in the nature of international relations; the US would support the operations of other countries rather than lead them, as it has done in the past. Whether this shift will occur remains to be seen.
Editor’s Note: The National Security Policy Group is a subgroup of the Institute of Politics at Harvard. It has been studying security policy throughout the course of this term, and the HPR is pleased to publish its findings.
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