Pacific Pivot

Last year, President Obama announced the ‘Pacific Pivot,’ a rebalancing of American international emphasis away from Europe and the Middle East and toward East Asia. In declaring this new foreign policy doctrine, President Obama addressed the Australian Parliament and revealed the deployment of an additional 2,500 U.S. troops in Australia. This symbolic measure established the Pacific as the geopolitical playing field for the next century. Anticipating the ascendancy of nations from the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is quickly establishing the former British prison colony as its foreign policy anchor for potentially tumultuous times ahead.
Comprehending America’s particular interest in Australia is easy: the two nations share a common heritage, language, and powerful values system. Since the emergence of their alliance during World War II, the two have fought together in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, bound together by the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS).
Sixty years later, the United States still has this geopolitically critical cornerstone as its leading ally in the Pacific. However, this relationship is worth exploring from both perspectives. Australia, a vestige of colonialism, is much closer geographically to Asia, and as China spreads its wings, Australia is the first Western country on the frontline of massive Chinese immigration and direct investment. In an opinion piece for The Australian, Chris Bowen, a member of the Australian House of Representatives remarked, “Immigration paves our way into the Asian century.” The article highlighted that last year, for the first time, more people moved to Australia from China than from any other country.
China has also emerged as an important Australian trading partner, accounting for around 25 percent of Australian bilateral trade. Its prominent economic relationships with East Asian countries, attributed to the Anglophone country’s unmatched exports of coal and iron core, has led to Australia’s active participation in and leadership of various regional multilateral groupings. If the next century belongs to Asia, Australia appears primed to engage the world.
The Internal Debate
Despite the confluence of geographical and demographic factors that suggest an Asian-oriented future for Australia, top Australian diplomatic voices reject this possibility. Prime Minister Julia Gillard remarked last year, “Australia is an ally [of the United States] for all the years to come.” Accordingly, the relationship Ms. Gillard has with President Obama is as strong as the one her predecessor, John Howard, had with President Bush.
In 1996, the conservative Howard became Prime Minister, a moment crucial to understanding the recent history of competing Australian visions of the Asian neighborhood. Howard’s predecessor, Labor Prime Minister Paul Keating, championed a policy of ‘Asian enmeshment.’ Keating’s government played a commanding role in the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), a primary institutional driver of trade liberalization in the Pacific Rim. By the early 1990s, scholars were predicting the ‘Asianization of Australia,’ most notably in Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations, which characterized Australia as one among a few “torn countries” on the world’s civilizational frontiers. Despite Keating’s assurances that he did not envision Australia as an Asian state, he was trounced at the polls. As Michael Evans, a fellow at the Australian Defence College told the HPR, “Culture will always trump geography in Australian political discourse.” Continuing, Evans underscored the importance of the, “inner strength of Australia’s liberal democratic culture and its Judeo-Christian ethic.”
Economics of Strategic Alignment
While Howard’s government came to power partly because of the unpopularity of his predecessor’s Asian enthusiasm, it was George W. Bush’s ‘man of steel’ that presided over the beginning of the Sino-Australian trade boom. China’s rapacious importation of Australia’s natural resources might have even saved Australia from following into the recent recession. A mere three years ago, energy and mineral exports to China comprised 80 percent of Australian merchandise exports, evidence that an Australian economic shift towards Asia is perhaps inevitable.
From Australia’s perspective, it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the lucre associated with the Chinese economic boom. The increasing rivalry between the United States and China will dominate Australian strategic thought throughout the upcoming years. But while recognizing the economic realities of the Asia-Pacific region’s ascendancy is essential, Professor Nick Bisley of Australia’s La Trobe University reminds us that one must also recognize the significance of the Australian-U.S. economic relationship. He tells the HPR, “The U.S. is Australia’s number two [bilateral trade] partner and… accounts for the lion’s share of [Foreign Direct Investment].” Simply put, while maintaining a solid relationship with China is undoubtedly important, it would be unthinkable for Australia to jeopardize its economic ties with what the world’s primary superpower.
Staying Power of American Arms
Of course, the American Pacific pivot has one focus in mind: reminding China that the United States retains a significant role in the region. This represents a new step in the 60-year military alliance between Australia and the United States, and although Sino-American conflict in the region could theoretically give Australia importance as a regional fulcrum, wartime financial damage would far outweigh any benefits of increased geopolitical importance. Bisley states plainly, “Given our strategic links to the U.S., however, there’s pretty much only downside to Sino-American conflict for Australia. Hence we are very keen on multilateral processes that include both China and the U.S. as they provide the only venue in which exposed third parties can shape the big bilateral relationship.”
Though Australia hopes to avoid international crisis, political realities are impossible to ignore. Evans made it clear that pure neutrality is, “not an option for us because we are on the cusp of Southeast Asia and the long memory of the war with Japan informs the need for alliance partners.” Fundamentally, “a neutral Australia aligned to neither the U.S. nor China is highly unlikely. China has long reconciled itself to the reality of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. It may not like it, but it accepts its reality.”
One might conclude that Australia’s preference for the American camp in the likely future bipolar world is rooted in a perceived kinship of history and culture. While both are important, the pragmatic case for this trans-Pacific alignment remains strong. As Australian domestic politics lead to the development of European-style social democracy, record-low defense spending will pave the way for America to ramp up its military assets in Australia, intertwining the two nations’ fates for years to come. With this in mind, it becomes a bit clearer why Australian politicians remain keen, despite changing regional fortunes, on reminding America of just how much they appreciate its patronage.