Soon after 9/11, the American media rediscovered the aesthetics of military deployment. Melancholy scenes of soldiers in fatigues waving to red-eyed wives and baffled-looking children are a common sight on CNN. The focus is on the emotion, but much less often do we hear what the soldiers have to say about their experiences. But a penny for their thoughts here:
For more than 11 years, a broad coalition — cumulatively 50 percent of the global economy’s military power — has tried to make a nation-state out of Afghanistan. But with more than 3,000 coalition lives lost and fortunes spent on frustrated development efforts, international support for the government of Afghanistan is waning. By the end of 2014, the bulk of the U.S.-led NATO forces will have withdrawn, and there is widespread doubt over the Western-backed government’s ability to hold together its shaky string of tribal alliances without the presence of foreign armies. The staying power of Hamid Karzai’s regime seems weak without extensive American and European support.
The future of Afghanistan did not seem so grim in 2001. Immediately after the impressive post-9/11 campaign that ousted the Taliban regime, efforts to create a Western-style democratic state seemed wise; an effective government would end decades of strife for the Afghan people and keep belligerent extremists out. But, in retrospect, the vision of a durable Afghan state seems naïve — or perhaps even arrogant, depending on how harshly you judge the initial misevaluation of a fractured tribal landscape that makes administering the simple rule of law, let alone full-fledged democracy, an exceptional challenge. But why exactly did more than a decade of extensive security and development efforts fail to quell the Taliban insurgency and create a solid government?
I spoke separately with three U.S. officers whose collective experience spans all levels of Operation Enduring Freedom — strategic, operational, and tactical. Each gave answers on the condition of anonymity, but their candid accounts explain the difficulties of nation building efforts in the war-torn, ethno-centric landscape of Afghanistan. At the strategic and operational level, a steep learning curve in the art of nation building and rampant corruption in Afghan politics stymied efforts to create a durable, effective state. At the tactical level — the on-the-ground level, so to speak — the war for Afghan public opinion has been undermined by a resilient, well-ingrained insurgency and the dysfunctional frontier with Pakistan.
Nation Building: Learning the Hard Way
The U.S.-NATO concept of nation building adheres to the big picture RAND Corporation definition, where intervening powers undertake “the use of force in the aftermath of a crisis to promote a transition to democracy.” The overarching objective of coalition forces in Afghanistan has been to establish a strong, democratically elected Afghan Federal Government. But, the U.S. and NATO were newcomers to nation building in 2001, and it is evident that there is a steep learning curve in the business of building democracy out of a war-torn collection of tribes. From the perspective of the service members I interviewed, the U.S. and NATO did not have a clear vision of how to approach Afghanistan in the long run, which has certainly had repercussions. According to one officer: “The prevailing thought following the removal of the Taliban was that Afghanistan’s political structure would rise without the full assistance of the international community.” Currently, with the benefit of hard learned lessons, there is the understanding that a nation building effort requires comprehensive support; but in the early stages of the Afghanistan campaign, the coalition largely ignored economic and political development. The focus of resources on Iraq hindered the earlier years of post-9/11 Afghanistan, and a disproportionate emphasis on security over development still affects international efforts in Afghanistan today.
A balanced effort requires “The Whole of Government” — the full spectrum of federal agencies in addition to the Department of Defense and intelligence community. From the Department of Justice to the Department of Agriculture, efforts to modernize and govern a country that seems like it’s in the stone age requires more than the war fighting and intelligence gathering skill set. Non-defense oriented agencies provide key expertise in economic development and government. Outside of the security and intelligence agencies, other personnel contributors would seldom send their best and brightest. For the most part, only those in need of extra pay or running from dysfunctional personal lives would volunteer for time in Afghanistan.
One officer felt frustrated by disunity at the strategic level of the campaign: “The cyclic rate of turnover promoted a command and control atmosphere where one of the principals of war, Unity of Command, did not exist among Americans and coalition general officers. Each of the six regional commanding generals acted as individuals and commanded their regions as they saw fit, and, for example, did not execute a common information operation campaign.” The confusion and stove piping trickled down to the Afghan military officers in their General Staff of the Ministry of Defense. In fact, the coalition staff crafted the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense’s campaign plan. Frequent turnovers also prevented a common narrative. “For example, Major General James Terry, Commander of Regional Command South in Kandahar, rarely participated in his higher headquarters’ (ISAF Joint Command) regularly scheduled Adobe DCO meetings thereby missing out on critical guidance and directions. He was promoted to Lieutenant General and is now currently the Commander of the ISAF Joint Command.”
The Good Old Boy’s Club
Making a healthy democracy requires the intellectual and emotional buy-in of a certain percentage of the populace, and thus, to some extent, it requires nationalism. But Afghanistan has been divided along tribal-ethnic lines for millennia, primarily between the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns. Zahir Shah’s monarchy ruled Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973, but after decades of conflict, there is a strong culture of nepotism and profiteering that hinders governance in Afghanistan. As one veteran recounts, “When attempts are made to enforce rule of law, governance, and security, the Afghans think first of how this will affect the smaller family unit.” There is no equivalent thought for the future of democracy or Karzai’s regime.
Some contend that this reflects the harsh reality that there is no real shared value system between the West and the Afghans. Rule by elected officials is as foreign to Afghans as the notion of Islamic law is to the American public. The sort of nationalism that is felt by citizens in the U.S. or Europe is not natural for a collection of ethnic groups that have been at war — either with themselves or foreign occupiers — for decades.
The leadership of the Afghan government is a reflection of the larger trends in its people. Hamid Karzai, the questionably elected, Western-backed president of Afghanistan, does not seek to foster a shared value system with its international partners. Fellow tribesmen and extended family members staff Karzai’s sultanistic regime. Servicemen claim that the U.S.. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), an entire federal agency, has trouble keeping track of inefficiency and theft in the regime. Even individuals exposed for corruption emerge a short while later in a different position in another area of the country. One officer cites that as of early 2013, “Eleven ministers were summoned to Kabul to explain why less than 50 percent of their annual budgets were spent during their previous fiscal year.” In another officer’s opinion: “They are preparing themselves and their families for the American withdrawal.”
The seeming futility of the effort to stand up an Afghan government takes a toll on the Western mindset, too. One officer recalls difficulties in motivating young soldiers to embrace tactics that revolve around protecting a population that frequently finds joy in the death and maiming of foreign soldiers.
At the Tactical Level: Waging Counterinsurgency
Although the officers reiterated the cavernous disparities between the Western perspective of government and the tribal perspective, each still defined the fight against the Taliban as a battle for public opinion. Even in the larger context of the ‘War on Terror’ — (not that Afghanistan is really about counterterrorism these days, with fewer than 400 hard core al Qaeda fighters left in the region) — the image of the U.S.-led coalition in a military conflict in the Islamic world is potent and far-reaching.
Within Afghanistan, the battle for public opinion is difficult for coalition forces to win. Even as the Taliban frequently receives negative coverage from the Afghan media, there is a huge amount of backlash for civilian casualties in the form of anti-Western sentiment. The local media frequently misreports civilian casualties, either exaggerating the numbers of misrepresenting the circumstances that surround Afghan deaths. The misuse of force does happen, particularly in new units with little experience or when bad intelligence is used in a strike. But the tide of public opinion flows against foreign militaries in combat with the local people.
Interestingly, storytelling is not just a tactic used by the local media. One officer with extensive experience at the tactical level in Afghanistan described U.S. efforts as a nuanced, cautious approach to combating the insurgency. Using force to completely kill remaining insurgents might actually result in widespread negative sentiment towards the coalition and the Afghan government. The process of removing particularly nefarious individuals from the picture is highly calculated; forces weigh the effects of removing a leader based on who will take his place. A smear campaign to undermine the caustic militant’s base of support is often preferable to the use of force in fights where public opinion — not body counts — sets the threshold for success and failure.
After more than eleven years of fighting, the Taliban is still able to disrupt security and pose a serious threat to the Afghan Army and coalition troops. The Taliban often presents a better option for rural Afghans by providing basic governing functions like conflict resolution. In some situations, the Sharia law enforced by insurgents facilitates more comprehensive rule of law than can be provided by the central government. Other times, the Taliban persuade locals to align out of fear of reprisals. The choice between life and death is a powerful tool the Taliban leverage to obtain the support of locals.
Apart from winning the opinion of some Afghans on a cultural and practical level, the insurgency is well resourced by the highly dysfunctional Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. One officer put it bluntly: “The Taliban’s power base is nothing but a complex criminal organization that the U.S. has made rich by providing aid to Pakistan.” Since Pakistan does not have control over much of the Afghan border region, Pakistani funds make it into the hands of insurgent networks for political purposes. The Haqqani network, for instance, is a unified group of tribes and criminal interests that maintain their power through the age-old tribal system. The heroin trade and profiteering from U.S. logistics shipments through Haqqani turf, along with funding that trickles down from the Pakistani government, funds a cross-border insurgency. Since the coalition respects the Pakistani border, much of the border region is controlled by a well-resourced, insurgent shadow government.
The Future of Afghanistan’s Government
All officers interviewed doubt the staying power of the Afghan army and police after the U.S.-NATO drawdown. The insurgency remains effective, evidenced by their ability to provoke fear in the population and challenge security forces, but the foreign-backed government cannot even pay its army and police forces without foreign support. To say that Afghanistan has a security problem is an understatement.
A corrupt, inefficient regime set in opposition to an insurgent faction that has shown little intention to come to the bargaining table is a recipe for a failed state. Evidently, Afghans within the government do not have faith in the state either. As one of my sources reports:
I’ve met many, many Afghan policemen, customs officers and soldiers who claimed that once the Americans leave Afghanistan, they will burn their military identification cards, uniforms and any article linking them to the Afghan National Security Forces. They also suggested they would leave the country post haste with their families in tow, fearing retribution from the Taliban and insurgency for assisting and partnering with coalition forces.
Contrary to allegations that more troops and more money would solve the Afghan problem, all officers interviewed do not fully believe that more resources would have solved the political and security problems at hand in Afghanistan. Even massive troop commitments could not address the structural problems of Afghanistan, such as a system of tribal politics, that make nation building difficult. In fact, one source suggested that we invested too much: “This was an exercise in rampant U.S. defense spending, failed transparency, failure of the U.S. Congress to hold U.S. agencies in theater and U.S. military officers accountable, and negligence by contracting officers to be outstanding stewards of U.S. taxpayer dollars.”
According to General Raymond Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, the orders of soldiers deployed to Afghanistan may be extended because sequestration budget cuts will severely limit the Army’s ability to properly train replacement brigades. Will the stress of our soldiers have achieved anything in the end? What lies ahead? It is not impossible that a peaceful alliance of tribes will emerge from 40 years of turmoil. But it seems like the lofty goal of a strong Afghan government will not come to fruition, and the best our military can hope for is a happy homecoming, perhaps filmed for the 6 o’clock segment on CNN.
