Even as the Somalian pirate movie Captain Phillips receives rave reviews, airwaves that had been rife with Somali pirate stories are now strangely silent. At first glance, piracy in the once perilous Gulf of Eden seems to have gone AWOL as camera lenses refocus on land conflict between the Somali government and Islamist terror group Al-Shabaab.
Tom Hanks’ intense portrayal of a heroic naval captain in the midst of the MV Maersk Alabama’s takedown seems to exemplify the U.S. mantra: we saw, we came, we sent troops. But, having bided their time during Somalia’s inclement monsoon season, the once-quiet seas are now seeing a rebirth of piracy, with two attacks on commercial ships this October alone. A closer look at the issue reveals that the multinational military suppression of pirates—so praised by the international community and idolized by Hollywood—fails to solve the true quandary at hand: state building within Somalia. Piracy, which at times seems like a peripheral issue, is in fact a telling indicator of the enormous challenges the region faces.
Beyond Piracy
Somalia’s ongoing civil war, now in its 22nd year, has severely taxed the government’s ability to create accountable institutions. The situation is not an independent conflict of its own, but rather a symptom of political breakdown. Having started in the early 1990s, piracy emerged from a combination of strong clan associations and a weak rule of law; in fact, piracy thrives mainly as a form of indirect political control—stable enough to provide a steady flow of illegal income, but weak enough to provide multiple options for legal evasion.
Yet the rise of piracy is much more than a function of state structure. With rampant overfishing by other countries in the Gulf and a crowding out of employment on land, Somali fishermen and other unemployed youth began to see piracy as an increasingly legitimate alternative. Dr. Peter Lehr of the University of St. Andrews told the HPR of disturbing, quasi-imperialist elements of this narrative. “Piracy started as a self-defense system for fishermen against foreign trawlers that looked to capitalize and infringe on Somalia’s maritime advantages such as Bluefin tuna and lobster fishing,” he said. As a result, fishermen began learning to arm small boats and “defend themselves against these illegal trawlers.”
One might argue that the countries that engaged in this predatory fishing in the first place—including the U.S., much
of western Europe, and even some Asian powers—have some responsibility towards solving the issue. These nations must ultimately recognize that the task at hand requires a more nuanced solution than simply sending naval forces into the area. Unlike the developments of other business opportunities, the main problem with piracy’s reoccurrence is its co-optation of Somali culture. Societal beliefs in wealth redistribution as well as the fluidity between loosely associated clans have allowed piracy to maintain public support. Pirates, returning with valuable goods and splitting them among a town, are often rendered not as criminals, but heroes.
To be sure, the current economic incentives toward piracy are enormous. “There are many factors in Somali culture that make piracy a very legitimate choice,” said Dr. Anja Shortland of King’s College in London. “You can make a lot of profit, there’s an elastic labor market from which you can cheaply hire people to get into the boats and get very reasonable ransoms.” Shortland, who published a research paper on the use of satellite imaging to track the developmental benefits of piracy last January, posited that the entrenched nature of piracy had extended beyond Somali shores. “It’s not just about the guy in the boat. It’s about the hordes of unemployed people in Somalia, in the horn of Africa, that are looking to piracy as a way to make a living.”
The core problem then, isn’t that pirates are heading out to sea. The problem is the lack of alternative choices that forces young men to drift in and out of illegal economies to put food on the table. A situation that puts these people in such a position and then calls for multinational efforts to resolve this problem not to the benefit of the Somalian people but rather to that of foreign naval shippers has proven grossly ineffective and perhaps demonizes pirates beyond a fair level.
The Unsatisfactory International Response
Ironically, the response to piracy has long been hailed as an unprecedented move of multi-lateral unity. But many fail to recognize why such unity exists. Countries that are not traditionally allies are only willing to agree on policies that economically benefit both sides: in this case, increasing anti-piracy patrolling operations. The lynchpin of these agreements does not turn on mutual interest for Somali security, but rather a selfish economic protection that fails to establish a long-term solution.
Military experts such as Donna Hopkins, coordinator of Counter Piracy and Maritime Security under the U.S. Department of State, argue that the military aspects of the solution are strikingly uncomprehensive. “The military operations employed by the U.S. and other countries only comprise about 20 percent of the solution. The other 80 percent includes the capacity-building of Somalia and the construction of a legal system that establishes a real sense of justice in the country,” Hopkins told the HPR. She added that there are “strategic reasons” for why we might coordinate with Somalia in the Indian Ocean that revolve around state-building as well.
Diving deeper into the issue, we see that the very imperial powers that have weakened Somalia are only interested in its sovereignty insofar as it provides a safe artery for their own commercial cargo. This highly problematic paradigm is exactly what has delegitimized foreign intervention around the world as a front for ulterior motives. Due to these efforts, the number of pirate attacks has dropped from 151 in 2009 to just 11 this year. But the facts and figures tell a Disney movie-like story. Pirate attacks have dropped sharply with the implementation of Task Force 151 and Operation Atalanta, two of the primary naval efforts at stopping the problem dead in the water.
Whether this ending is favorable or not depends on where you end the story. Many fail to recognize the staggering ratio
we spend to the amount we save: almost $18 billion in private military contractors and naval efforts versus the $50-100 million in ransom monies that pirates bring in every year. And even with billions of dollars being poured into the Gulf of Aden, the internal affairs of the Somali state have not received nearly as much support. The willingness to curb the results of a problem, rather than to reform the problematic government that gives it life, is troublesome to say the least.
Increasing engagement with societal reform within the Somalian presidency may yield hope for Somalia’s future. In a conversation with His Excellency Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud and spokesperson Abdirahman Omar Osman, the President of Somalia told the HPR of tightening efforts against piracy and other internal problems. “My government believes that the best way to deal with piracy is to address the root causes of piracy, which are poverty, lawlessness, lack of opportunities for our young people, and lack of functioning institutions,” he said. “There are traces of success, but it’s limited. This is an enormous task that our government currently does not have the resources to deal with,” Mohamoud said, attaching an ominous condition to what otherwise seemed optimistic.
And in dealing with these issues, multinational unity in
naval patrolling does decidedly little. It does not alleviate the core problems of the government, it does not build sustainable economic opportunities for Somalis, and it certainly does not dispel widespread antagonism and mistrust of foreign “aid.” So whether the United States decides to shift focus from firepower to human capital is a question that remains to be answered, both eagerly and desperately awaited by people who have been disappointed for decades.
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