Since the fall of Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, Egypt has undergone intense political turbulence and reshuffling as various parties vie for political control of the nation. The political landscape is dotted with myriad different organizations and groups—the military, the police force, the secularists, the Coptic Christians, the Islamists, the non-aligned Muslims, and many others—which together form a complex and turbulent web of relations and alliances. In the three years that have now passed since Mubarak’s resignation, only one civilian group has remained continuously influential in shaping the Egyptian system of government and political discourse: the Islamist parties.
Al-Ikwhaan: A Band of Brothers
Egypt has had a long history of Islamist movements, but the oldest, largest, and perhaps most well known of its multitude of faith-based political parties is al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimuun, the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the Council on Foreign Relations even goes so far as to claim that the group is “widely considered the world’s most influential Islamist organization.” Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, one of Egypt’s preeminent political and religious leaders in the early 1900s, the Brotherhood is a Sunni Muslim revivalist organization that, in al-Banna’s original calculation, was founded to counter “corrupting” Western influences in Egypt through Islamic education and charity.
This overarching purpose became muddied, however, once the organization began involving itself in Egypt’s politics. As early as the 1940s the group’s membership had reached 500,000 in Egypt alone, and its ideologies had diffused throughout the surrounding region. The Brothers’ first foray into the political arena happened around this time as well: they participated in the violent independence struggle against British rule of Egypt. A brand new “paramilitary wing” of the organization—founded by al-Banna himself—continued to carry out armed actions and promptly invoked the ire of the newly independent government at the time, which, in 1948, ruled to dissolve the organization.
However, the group continued to feature prominently in Egyptian political affairs, especially after its assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi in 1948 (though al-Banna officially denied affiliation with the attack and denounced the killing altogether). Then, in 1952, the Brotherhood returned to the political forefront with the attempted assassination of then-President Gamal Abdul Nasser. As a result, the government commenced active suppression of the Brotherhood: countless members and preeminent leaders within the group were arrested, tortured, incarcerated and, in some cases, killed. One leader who faced such a fate was Sayyid Qutb. From his jail cell, Qutb produced multiple volumes of ideological writing advocating violent resistance, or jihad, to the coercion and suppression facing the Brotherhood at the time. Experts agree that his works precipitated a shift in the outlook of many members of the Brotherhood and are often cited as the ideological framework for such modern extremist Islamic groups as al-Qaeda and Hamas. His advocacy of violent resistance has continued to influence the actions of the Brotherhood to this day; before him, they rarely used large-scale violent attacks to promote their causes.
After this period of suppression, however, the Brotherhood’s history became one of struggle to regain clout in the political mainstream. It began succeeding beginning in the late 1980s, and despite then-President Mubarak’s condemnation, it steadily gained more and more seats in each successive round of parliamentary elections from 2000 onward. The Brotherhood supported the 2011 youth revolts that prompted Mubarak to resign as President, and in the aftermath of that resignation it scrambled to concoct a political strategy that would revitalize its image and role in Egyptian politics. On all counts, the Brothers succeeded in this endeavor, founding the technically “non-theocratic” Freedom and Justice Party and espousing ideals of inclusivity (the party included women and Christians) and assistance for the downtrodden. Their strategizing worked and, suddenly, the organization that had spent almost all of its history (and certainly the last thirty years) being banned by the government won a steep plurality in that government’s parliamentary elections.
Since that point, the Brotherhood has dominated Egyptian politics. Their candidate, Mohammed Morsi, won the 2012 presidential election with a 51% majority, amidst multiple accusations that the Brotherhood had “bought votes” by giving away bread and other luxuries to the poorest members of Egyptian society. His success was only possible, however, with the added Islamist votes of the ultraconservative Salafi parties.
Al-Salafi: Splintered, But Powerful
The Salafis comprise the other major Islamist group in Egypt. They are, however, a larger organization spanning the Middle East, espousing ultraconservative Sunni Muslim ideology, and, in the words of the New York Times, “vying to define the new order according to seventh century religious traditions.” The Salafis only emerged in Egypt in 2011, in the wake of Mubarak’s ouster, and like the Brotherhood they scurried to mobilize politically before the 2012 parliamentary elections. Also like the Brotherhood, their campaigning proved successful, and they won 25 percent of the seats in both houses of Parliament, second only to the Brotherhood. Thus, in the first elections after the fall of Mubarak, overtly Islamist parties together held almost complete control of Egypt’s foremost political body.
What distinguishes the Salafis from the Brotherhood, however, is their relative lack of organization and cohesion. They are loosely connected to each other, united only in a general desire for a government that upholds sharia law. Many disagree, however, on how that would actually translate to a government in practice. Thus, the group is split into multiple factions, some more moderate than others, but all adhering to a grand vision of Egypt as an Islamic state. Of the numerous factions, perhaps the most influential is al-Da’wa al Salafiyya, which translates to “Salafi Calling.” Based in Alexandria, Salafi Calling differs from the rest of the Salafi groups in a few significant ways. While most Salafis offer respect to any Muslim leader (there is a written rule among Salafis that prohibits uprisings against any leader of Muslim faith), Salafi Calling more extreme, refusing to recognize a leader as Muslim if he does not uphold the strictest form of sharia law.
By this standard, the faction had no problem with Mubarak’s resignation in 2011, and were the ones who actually capitalized on the political vacuum left in his wake. Founding the political party Al-Nour, they put themselves in the political mainstream via a whirlwind of campaigning, touting piety and lambasting the existing political elite. Their success in the 2012 elections was due in large part to the votes of other Salafis in the country as well as conservative Muslims who had grown weary of the Brotherhood. Al-Nour’s politicking has always been a departure from most other Salafist parties and factions. Tensions between its leaders and the leaders of the Brotherhood have led it to denounce Brotherhood influence in the government. It openly supported Sisi’s overthrow of Morsi and Brotherhood rule, even while most other Salafis ardently opposed the ouster as undemocratic and dangerous to political Islam. Many assume that Al Nour’s distaste for the Brotherhood comes from the belief that they are not appropriately carrying out an Islamic framework for government, as well as from a desire to gain control of their own over Egypt’s political institutions.
The Convergence
In the present day, Egypt’s political scene is largely characterized by the clash between the military, helmed by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and the Brotherhood, following the military’s overthrow of Morsi last summer. Language surrounding Morsi’s ouster is politically charged: many have labeled it a coup d’etat, with the armed forces effectively replacing Morsi’s regime with complete military rule. Many anti-Morsi and anti-Brotherhood Egyptians, however, contest that description. The military was merely serving the will of the people, they argue, and therefore its actions cannot be considered a coup.
Coup or not, the military, though always influential, indisputably became the most powerful force in Egyptian politics after Morsi’s fall; the members of the Brotherhood, despite their initially nonviolent protests of the ouster, became the military’s number one targets. As tensions mounted, violence broke out on both sides. Hundreds of Brotherhood members were killed, arrested and tortured at protest sites and sit-ins beginning in July of last year; these attacks sparked equally violent and deadly retaliation from the Brotherhood on everything from Coptic churches to public marketplaces. Many non-aligned and largely innocent members of the Egyptian populace have been caught in this deadly crossfire, and countless lives have been lost.
Throughout it all, the Salafis have been split in their alliances and support. Many factions of the movement continue to express solidarity with the Brotherhood cause, applauding their vision of Egypt as an Islamic state ruled by sharia. Al-Nour, however, has continued to align itself firmly with al-Sisi and the military. Meanwhile, non-aligned, liberal, Christian, and secularist candidates have had little to no role in the nation’s politics, overshadowed by the military and Islamist power players. While it is unlikely that the Brotherhood or Al-Nour will advance a winning candidate in the upcoming elections due to the overwhelming unpopularity of Morsi, there is no question that political Islam is an extremely significant and seemingly permanent part of Egyptian politics, despite all of the efforts on the military’s part to eradicate it. The exact role it will play in the nation’s government and whether or not it can truly buy the support of a majority of the Egyptian populace, however, remains a murkier question.
Media credit: Andrew Ma.
