Will and Alex have begun an interesting discussion on realist and constructivist views of “anarchy” in the international system, but I think the realist position on the ICC and other treaties could use greater elaboration. A typical realist view would be not just that some states form “persecution narratives” to oppose the United States, but that in general nation-states tend to manipulate international institutions to serve national interests.
Take the UN Human Rights Council, for example. How surprising is it that rights-abusingmember states such as Saudi Arabia, Cuba, and Egypt have not been impartial judges of human rights violations? Blatant crimes by states such as Sudan and North Korea have been ignored, andat one point criticism of Israel became so absurdlydisproportionate that the Secretary-General reproached the Council using the vocabulary of a kindergarten teacher. In practice, just like domestic courts, international tribunals require judges with integrity to work; it is not enough to “construct” a less anarchic international system on paper.
More generally, treatiessuch as the ICC may be part of a strategy of “legalism” used to reign in dominant powers. Like the “persecution narrative,” legalism can be considered an aspect of balancing behavior. When countries don’t have military and economic muscle to flex in the international arena, they have an incentive to strap strong competitors with treaties. International law thus becomes a favored instrument of the world’s clever but feeble Lilliputians (think Switzerland or Belgium), while the US tendency is perhaps best captured by the title of Stanley Hoffman’s recent book: Gulliver Unbound.
To the question of whether we “want” an anarchic international arena I think the answer must be yes – to some extent. Theoretically a strong, centralized World Government could contain anarchy, but at the expense of an unnerving concentration of power. A “less anarchic” international system would be desirable, I believe, but without a World Government one has to wonder whether in each instance states will rig international law to parochial purposes, and what the consequences will be.
Would US participation in the ICC, for example, lessen international anarchy or merely reshape the playing field in a way unfavorable to the exercise of American power? For many advocates of US participation in the ICC (and other international treaties), the desire to curb American power – particularly in an era of unsettling interventionism – may be just as important as ideological commitment.
