Chuck Hagel and John Kerry represent a new future for American foreign policy. President Obama has already drawn to a close the wars of his predecessor, but otherwise echoed the Clinton era foreign policy — strong and influential, while restrained. Kerry and Hagel, on the other hand, stress a much more limited international role than their predecessors, Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta, respectively. Thus, there’s bound to be major defense cuts. Few other areas are seen as bloated by both pro-entitlement liberals and small-government conservatives, and that combination could lead to oversized cuts.
The arguments in favor of cutting defense are strong, and I tend to agree with them. We spend more on national security than the next fourteen countries combined, ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reduces costs, and the national debt might be our biggest threat to national security. Reasonable cuts should and will come, but we have the terrifying prospect that politicians might have a bipartisan scapegoat. Does anyone think politicians won’t try to avoid tough choices elsewhere (e.g., entitlements, revenues, etc.) by cutting as much from the defense budget as possible? Two of the three major ideologies in Washington support defense cuts and could form a powerful coalition.
Traditional conservative arguments for a strong national security are well known. From nationalism to Bastiat, old-guard conservatives (“neoconservatives”) fall lockstep behind a large defense budget. The likes of John McCain will rail against cutting a nickel.
However, conservatism has a trendy cousin known as libertarianism, and its adherents support pretty hefty cuts. Tea Party Republicans will be tempered somewhat by their traditionally conservative-minded bases, but their principles support a smaller military. All things considered, a decent number of moderate and small government Republicans should back defense cuts.
This leaves progressives. While generally the party of big government, Democrats support large-scale defense cuts and regularly filibustered defense budgets during the Bush presidency. Liberal foreign policy simply does not call for the same policeman role within international affairs; instead, Democrats think money is better spent on social programs. As much as these arguments are valid, progressives need to recognize that their own ideology aligns quite well with some arguments for defense spending — and thus should not too eagerly look to cut the defense budget.
First, the power our armed forces give us within the international community doesn’t necessarily require us to become policemen of the world. Instead, this enhanced power has regularly allowed America to stand up for human rights throughout the world — to “speak softly and carry a big stick.” If a country without a worthwhile military behind it tried to butt into peace negotiations, it would be laughably ignored. On the other hand, America has a hand in everything from Israeli-Palestinian talks to human rights concerns in Africa.
Second, our defense budget has a humanitarian purpose to it. Admittedly, humanitarian support can be similar to the occupation that liberals oppose; the only difference might be that humanitarian work generally has no “opposition.” This occurs more often than you would think — after natural disasters and wars, within extremely poor areas, and as a preventative measure before conflicts. Without a standing army, it would be impossible to satisfy any of these time-sensitive issues.
Third, defense keeps us safe. Even liberal economic policy acknowledges how advantageous safety is for our markets, and there’s the obvious benefit of not incurring any attacks.
Fourth, military spending — like any spending — does create a Keynesian stimulus to the economy. Since Eisenhower talked about the military-industrial complex, there’s been some hesitation about excessive military spending. Considering our military spending as a percent of GDP, however, pales in comparison to what it was in Eisenhower’s era, this doesn’t much apply. Fiscal multiplier effects of military spending are roughly 1.5, not including implicit gains. There are flaws to this logic, most notably the broken window fallacy, but the stimulative effects of military spending cannot be ignored. By no means are they the most efficient, but they exist. Military cuts will reduce economic growth and employment unless replaced by spending elsewhere. The military is inefficient enough that cuts could be fiscally neutral or at least not too painful, but cutting too far could cost jobs and productivity.
Finally, the research and development side of defense spending has led to significant scientific advances. Rocket technology made the moon landing possible; the Hubble telescope is essentially a spy telescope pointed outwards; nuclear generators developed from research on the atomic bomb; robotic advances largely spawned from the military; without American defense spending it’s possible that neither the Internet nor GPS technology would have been created as early as they were. Examples continue at length, and more projects continue today. While most advances are obviously military in nature, many side effects aid the rest of society. Defense cuts, from a progressive perspective, need to avoid the research and development side of spending as much as possible.
Like so many other issues, more nuisance exists than many would expect. Liberals should not whole-heartedly support budget cuts merely because that’s the usual liberal position. Progressivism is about the government helping people — which, if used right, the military does. The defense budget does far more than let us go to war, often aiding left-wing causes. Reasonable cuts should happen, but the Obama administration’s move towards small-defense liberalism could reach too far — progressives should not unconditionally let that happen.
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