Copenhagen postmortem and the question of climate aid.
After two years of intense negotiation and eager anticipation of a new international climate-change framework, the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 delivered weak progress towards a legally binding treaty. Conflict and stalemate characterized the negotiations in Copenhagen, often revealing deep-seated divisions between the developed and developing worlds. The widespread consensus on the seriousness of man-made global warming failed to overcome the immense collective-action problem—getting almost 200 nations to act in concert to reduce their emissions. Most of all, the conference was undermined by the failure of industrialized countries to uphold their end of the climate-change bargain.
The Road to Copenhagen
The Copenhagen Conference was the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The purpose of “COP 15” was to develop and ratify a new treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, the only existing global treaty regulating greenhouse gases, the first phase of which expires in 2012. At Copenhagen, the Obama administration was seeking a new model in which countries would agree to national schedules for mitigating emissions, with legally binding commitments from China, India, and other emerging economies.
Far from realizing the Obama administration’s dream of a new treaty to succeed Kyoto, the parties at Copenhagen refused to ratify even the watered-down Copenhagen Accord after a week of bitter negotiations. Instead, countries merely agreed to “take note” of the Accord, an interim agreement stating their intent to begin taking action on global warming.
The Copenhagen Accord conspicuously lacks a deadline for passing a binding treaty next year at COP 16 in Mexico, lowering the expectations for and likelihood of a comprehensive action plan to address climate change in the near future. Yet the agreement at Copenhagen represented at least a modicum of progress. Alden Meyer, director of policy for the Union of Concerned Scientists, told the HPR, “The Copenhagen Accord is clearly a work in progress. It is a voluntary framework, with negotiations to continue in 2010 towards a legally binding instrument that would either accompany or supersede the Kyoto Protocol.”
Still, the Copenhagen Accord lacks several essential elements necessary to halt the rise of global greenhouse-gas emissions. One glaring omission is a firm target for mid- or long-term reductions in emissions. In an interview with the HPR, Ben Lieberman, a specialist in energy and environmental issues at the Heritage Foundation, highlighted the lack of legally binding mechanisms. “In fact,” he said, “all that the Copenhagen Accord contains is vague aspirational language to the effect that it would be nice if each country decided on its own to reduce emissions. Even this face-saving language had to be pared back at the behest of China and other developing nations that didn’t want any hint that they might be obligated to do something.”
But David Doniger, the policy director for the Natural Resources Defense Council, told the HPR that the perception of Copenhagen as a failure is a reflection of unrealistic expectations. Doniger argued that the Copenhagen Accord successfully “provides for real cuts in heat-trapping carbon pollution by all of the world’s big emitters. It establishes a transparent framework for evaluating countries’ performance against their commitments. And it will start an unprecedented flow of resources to help poor and vulnerable nations cope with climate impacts, protect their forests, and adopt clean energy technologies.”
Show Me the Money
The Copenhagen talks ultimately hinged on the highly divisive issue of “climate aid,” or financial commitments to help developing countries combat climate change. Going into COP 15, major donor countries acknowledged the need for climate aid. Faced with increasing public scrutiny and a desire to build momentum for negotiations, many outlined tentative aid plans in the weeks before Copenhagen.
Nevertheless, just days into the conference, negotiators at Copenhagen were trapped in a stalemate. China and India opposed any meaningful targets for cutting emissions and inspection by international agencies. The deadlock persisted until Dec. 17, the penultimate day of the conference, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the Obama administration’s intent to work with other nations to “jointly mobilize $100 billion per year by 2020” and to contribute $10 billion annually to the fast-start funding pool by 2012. Clinton invigorated the ailing negotiations, and delegates scrambled to draft a new working paper.
But the cautious optimism that percolated at the close of COP 15 would be short-lived. New statements from developed countries after the conference suggested that the funds promised as part of vague climate-aid pledges would not be truly “new and additional.” They would count existing aid for poverty, food, and emergency programs. For developing countries, this revelation was a slap in the face, confirming longstanding fears that the burden of climate change, physically and fiscally, would be on their shoulders. Without a constituency that can lobby for a fair accounting procedure, donor states will continue to leverage their financial and political clout to minimize their true contribution levels.
As James Hansen, the director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, told Yes! magazine, the proposals discussed at Copenhagen were “like the indulgences of the Middle Ages. … The sinners are the developed countries, which are responsible for most of the excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. They want to continue business as usual, by buying off the developing countries.”
Between COP 15 and COP 16
The overall failure of Copenhagen points to the nearly insurmountable challenge of bringing together almost 200 countries with varying degrees of economic development to agree on concrete emissions-reduction targets. The standoff between developing and developed countries can be broken only with increased commitments to climate aid. American credibility now hinges on whether President Obama can act on his promise to raise tens of billions of dollars to help developing countries adapt to global warming, a possibility only if Congress passes cap-and-trade legislation. Obama, then, must lead the charge for developed nations to take responsibility for the huge burden that climate change imposes on developing nations. Without true financial leadership from the G8 countries, backing up their rhetorical commitments to a new treaty, breaking the deadlock at COP 16 will likely be nearly impossible.♦
Thomas Hwang ‘13 is a Contributing Writer. Taylor Lane ‘11 is a Staff Writer.
Photo Credit: EBO
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