Talks Bring Optimism

Last week I wrote about Bob Woodward’s new book which shed light on the uncertainty of the US situation in Afghanistan. This week, there seems to be signs of hope in the form of Afghanistan-Taliban peace negotiations. It was announced on Monday that Taliban representatives are authorized to negotiate with the Afghanistan government on behalf of the Quetta Shura, the Afghan Taliban organization based in Pakistan. More importantly, these representatives will represent the voice of Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, the man who not only serves as the Taliban’s spiritual leader but its effective commander and chief.
The Washington Post reported that the Quetta Shura have talked of a comprehensive agreement involving Taliban participation in the government and NATO troop withdrawals. Many have criticized Karzai for being soft on terrorism and not taking a hard stance militarily. However, Karzai seems eager to begin preliminary negotiations despite his prior resolution to not speak with insurgents unless they renounce violence, dissolve terrorists organizations and embrace the constitution. Such a position causes doubt as to the promise of such talks. Integrating the Taliban into the Afghan government seems at face value like a Taliban victory in the country, but its the first opportunity towards diplomacy the Afghan government and US and NATO leaders have had.
The major question that will be raised in addressing the potential for diplomatic resolution is the ability to negotiate with terrorists and the idea that the US will in some way concede after nearly a decade of fighting. What gives the US an advantageous position in negotiations is the fact that the Taliban has reached out to negotiate with the government, offering an initial point of concession. Yet the negotiations will put Karzai and President Obama in an objectively difficult situation. In a very real way, they have a potential to increase the influence of the Taliban over the Afghan government.
Such influence can only be viewed as a failure for US and NATO forces as well as the War on Terrorism. On the other hand, these negotiations represent the least costly method towards withdrawal. Based on the President’s plan for withdrawal, it seems that he will take full advantageous of any diplomacy offered by the Taliban. As expressed in Woodward’s book, Obama is unconcerned with winning the war, so if talks do progress, he will keep US diplomats in the background. Such news makes this continuing failure in American foreign policy seem close to its conclusion, but not if military leaders have their way.
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