The End of a Leftist Era

Why Chile’s new conservative leader isn’t much of a change.
On Jan. 17, the Chilean presidential run-off election concluded with the victory of a former Harvard economics teaching fellow, Sebastian Piñera. The Conservative Piñera, the third-richest Chilean and the holder of a Harvard Ph.D in economics, ended two decades of uninterrupted rule by the center-left Concert of Parties for Democracy with his defeat of Eduardo Frei, 52 percent to 48 percent.
Piñera’s victory may seem an anomaly in an increasingly leftist Latin America and in a country still harboring memories of right-wing dictator Augusto Pinochet. But Piñera’s ascension is not a sign of a fundamental conservative shift in Chilean politics. It is rather a testament to the long reign of the incumbent coalition, commonly known as the Concertación, and the desire for change after two decades of this coalition’s dominance. Frei’s personal weakness as a candidate and Piñera’s personal popularity were also major contributing factors to the upset. The future of Chilean politics will not be warring coalitions and divergent platforms, nor a lurch to the right, but an era of greater electoral competition and centrist two-party politics.
Change is Constant
“It had to happen,” Steven Levitsky, a Harvard government professor, told the HPR. “No matter how well the incumbent party does, electorates tire, and they want a change. It’s no big surprise.” And Frei was a particularly weak representative for the ruling party. As former president of Chile from 1994 to 2000, Frei governed unremarkably, allowing his term to be dominated by high unemployment rates. Many voters were also torn by the entrance of third-party Socialist candidate Marco Enriquez-Ominami, who broke off from the Concertación and won support from those dissatisfied with the ruling party but unwilling to support the right. He drew a strong 20 percent in the initial election and meekly endorsed Frei a week prior to the run-off. At the same time, Frei lacked the smooth, well-financed campaign effort of the billionaire Piñera, who owns the national Chilean airline LAN.
The defeat of the Concertación was also a function of Chile’s particular set of electoral rules, which restricts incumbents from pursuing immediate reelection. Were it not for these rules, the Concertación might have been able to capitalize on the strength of its incumbent, Michelle Bachelet, who has been President since 2006 and has accumulated an 80 percent approval rating. As Peter DeShazo, director of the Americas program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the HPR, “Her background, her life story, and her efforts to encourage consensus politics have made her exceedingly popular.” Bachelet’s strong response to the Chilean economic downturn in 2006 also bolstered her reputation. José Raúl Perales, an expert on Latin America at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, told the HPR, “She was effective at keeping the pain of adjustment as far from the Chilean people as possible. The ability of the government to respond effectively was the result of [her] specific efforts to save funds from commodity exports, especially copper.”
However, DeShazo reiterated, Bachelet’s popularity did not translate into enthusiasm for Frei. “Michelle Bachelet was key in that she injected more energy into the Concertación and that helped her popularity. But with Frei, it looked like a repeat of the past and the Chileans felt that they were ready for change, for new ideas.” Memories of Pinochet’s harsh dictatorship had long prevented party change, but “real democracies turn over,” Levitsky quipped. Chile, after twenty years, has finally turned over.
Center Consensus
Despite this turnover, Bachelet’s tenure will have a lasting impact on Chilean politics. Under Bachelet, Chile experienced remarkable economic, social, and political success; she revitalized the copper industry, completed the institutionalization of universal healthcare, and legitimized the place of women in politics.
Indeed, Frei and Piñera agreed on most major campaign issues. Aside from minor discrepancies in economic policy, the only sticking point was their commitment to human rights. Frei’s attacks on that score were powerful and poignant, but ultimately ineffective. His father, the president of Chile from 1964 to 1970 and a staunch critic of Pinochet, was mysteriously poisoned in 1982. Bachelet, a victim of torture during Pinochet’s reign, had supported judicial efforts to prosecute the Pinochet government’s crimes against humanity. As such, the two tried to exploit Piñera’s support for an amnesty bill that would have halted the investigation into numerous Pinochet-related deaths, including that of Frei’s father. Piñera’s position on allowing Pinochet supporters into his cabinet and party was also controversial; only after intense political and media pressure did he come to reject their inclusion in his coalition.
Nevertheless, concerns over Piñera’s dedication to human rights failed to have a significant impact on Chilean voters. As Levitsky argued, “certainly he’s got support from the left and he will not want to be perceived as leaning too far to the right, particularly on human rights.” DeShazo agreed that human rights had become a consensus issue in Chile. “Those issues have been widely dealt with over the last twenty years. … [Human rights are] not an issue at stake.”
It’s the Economy
Piñera’s strongest campaign plank was economic reform, and on this issue bipartisan consensus was especially evident. Piñera promised to create a million jobs, increase annual economic growth by six percent, and privatize part of Chile’s national copper industry. But no matter how much change Piñera may want, his policies cannot stray too far from the center. “He’s going to have to worry about having both his big legislative support and the support of the center voters who are not voting left for the first time,” said Levitsky. “He will be very sensitive to the electorate and I don’t think you will see him move dramatically to the right.” Indeed, Perales argued, “Piñera is very aware of the fact that he cannot rule Chile without the input of the Concertación. With a country so highly entrenched in the system of two major governing coalitions, it is impossible to rule without their input.” To do so would jeopardize the conservatives’ prospects in future Chilean elections.
While there is no possibility of direct reelection of presidents, Bachelet would be free to run again in 2014. Competition will likely be tougher then; Piñera has finally proven that Chilean conservatives can win national elections, opening the door to an entire new slate of presidential candidates. Given the voters’ current trust in Piñera’s business savvy, the winner of the next election will probably be determined to a large degree by the success of his economic policies. As for the immediate future, change will be less revolutionary than might seem likely. There will be no great shift rightward, but the election of Piñera represents a step in a broader trend towards greater electoral accountability and political consensus-building in Chile. ♦
Casey Thomson ‘13 is a Staff Writer.
Photo Credit: Flickr stream of Sebastian Pinera