Just this week, the White House announced that during President Obama’s visit to Japan for APEC, he would not be stopping by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as some had initially hoped. While Ben Rhodes, the Deputy National Security Advisor, has given the pretext of wanting “focus” on the APEC meeting, I can’t help but interpret this as another sign that the alliance, once hailed as the “most important relationship in the world, bar none,” is becoming increasingly adrift.
For now, the U.S.-Japan alliance doesn’t face any immediate crisis. In light of an emergent, more assertive China, both countries recognize their mutual dependence in order to keep China in check. Such logic was evident in the aftermath of the Senkaku incident, where after China threatened to escalate tensions, the U.S. arrived in the picture to add diplomatic muscle to Japan. If there were any doubts about U.S-Japan relations, such doubts were now laid to rest.
Yet, the “back-to-normal” sentiments conceal deeper problems that undermine relations. More than ever, Japanese are becoming disenchanted with America. In Okinawa for example, applications for base jobs have declined by nearly 50% from 15,572 applicants in 2003 to 7,611 in 2009, with positive perceptions about U.S. military involvement eroding. Japanese students seem less interested in studying English, with enrollment in U.S. universities dropping by 27% over the last decade.
On the part of the U.S., such indifference appears to be reciprocated. The last high-level meeting between both countries was almost fifteen years ago in 1996, culminating in the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration. Ever since, Washington has not mustered the effort to make an engagement of the same level, though the alliance stands in dire need of re-affirmation. Many U.S.-Japan institutions are also starved of support, such as the U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, a once-prestigious program that saw the enthusiastic participation of a single U.S. delegate in 2007.
Finally, where the alliance once existed as an active and dynamic bilateral relationship, judging from current circumstances, it’s hard to see where the alliance derives any existential meaning apart from its role in moderating China. When discussing U.S. policy in Far East, most analysts tend to dwell on the importance of the U.S.-China-Japan “triangle” — which is perfectly understandable — but what of U.S.-Japan relations as its own entity? Apart from security issues, what happened to the robust cultural, economic and intellectual dialogues that characterized the Reischauer and Mansfield years? If officials want to ensure a healthy future for the alliance, these are considerations they cannot ignore.
In closing, it’s worth noting that this year marks the 50th official anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. While it’s a historic occasion worth celebrating, one problem still persists: though preparations for the party have been made, there doesn’t seem to be any guests coming.
PHOTO: Wikimedia Commons
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