For democracy to prevail in Egypt, deposing Murbarak will not be enough. What is needed is an overhaul of state-military relations.
For supporters of democracy around the world, there was something inspiring about the sight of protestors gathered around Tahrir Square at Cairo. In his 1994 book, The End of History, Francis Fukuyama posited that liberal democracy would be the final destination for all states around the world; and while the ongoing experiences of countries like China still suggest otherwise, Egypt’s revolution seemed to confirm that we are, somehow, on the inexorable march towards democracy as a standard for the modern world.
Unfortunately, I fear that Egypt’s revolution hardly counts as a victory for Fukuyama’s thesis. The removal of Murbarak from power does not guarantee a transition to a properly functioning democracy, and many have been guilty of romanticizing the recent events in Egypt. In his op-ed for Project Syndicate, Chris Patten called it “a glorious example of the indefatigable courage of the human spirit”– an example of lofty rhetoric that ignores Egypt’s fundamental problems.
The basic fact is this: Egypt’s military still commands too much power for the revolution to effect any genuine or significant changes. For a democracy to function effectively, there needs to be a formal separation in civil-military relations. If this does not happen, the institutions of a country will become inherently instable, as the country’s reins will ultimately be in the hands of the military, not its civilians.
Currently, the relationship between Egypt’s military and the state can best be described as a parasitic one. While Egypt’s military provides the country stability, it undermines the state’s long-term interests by refusing privatization of the economy, and withholding political power from its citizens.
Egypt’s military currently remains deeply embedded, but it was not always intended to be this way. Writing for Political Science Quarterly, Georgetown’s Mehran Kamrava outlines the genesis of “ideological military states” like Egypt, tracing their historical roots:
Beginning with Iraq’s 1936 coup and lasting through the 1960s, the middle classes and other educated groups in the Middle East considered it almost natural for the military to take over the reins of power in order to start the process of political development… Apart from Algeria, where the movement for national liberation started from below and had a truly national component, all of the other early revolutions in the Middle East – excluding Iran’s – started from above and were led and orchestrated by highly ideological officers.
To consolidate power, many of these militaries relied on ideological platforms to gain popular legitimacy, casting their promises in nationalistic overtones. Nasser, for instance, was one such example of an officer-turned-visionary, renowned for standing up to the colonialists powers and inventing his own brand of Arab nationalism.
However, this movement was not sustainable. Politicization of the military also meant increasing its political aspirations, and with no common ideological ground, many militaries were soon embroiled in internal power struggles. Instead of fulfilling their promises for enacting change, these militaries came to resemble the autocratic regimes they once deposed. “Gone are the days of lofty promises and impending victories against global enemies,” Kamrava writes. “Today’s goal is simply to hang on to power.”
Thus, the political instability in many countries in the Middle East can be attributed to unresolved tensions in state-military relations, and Egypt is no exception. While posing as Egypt’s benign guardian, I would argue that Egypt’s military is the true culprit behind the situation. Overthrowing Murbarak may be a step in that direction, but as long as its military remains entrenched, Egypt will be trapped in a state of arrested development. For any meaningful change to occur, the military will have to be subordinated its citizens’ control.
For now, this outcome seems to be a remote possibility. Domestically, the military wields too much power, and short of an outbreak of violence, it is unlikely that civilians will successfully wrest it from them. Internationally, because the U.S. will prioritize its own interests in the region first, it will prefer a stable military ally (take Pakistan, for example) than risking resources to facilitate a proper democratic transition.
For these reasons, I believe the impact of Egypt’s revolution may ultimately prove to be limited. Unless state-military relations can be reconfigured, this may sadly be remembered as another episode in the country’s tumultuous history: a bright spark in a long passage of darkness.
Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons
