On the morning of April 25, 2026, the Malian Armed Forces and Russian Africa Corps garrisons in Mali woke up to an explosion in Bamako while scores of armed rebels raced towards cities across the country. In their first-ever coordinated strike, the Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg separatist group Front de Libération Azawad (FLA) attacked Malian and Russian military positions across the country. In a stunning show of force, the rebels killed the Malian defense minister, forced Africa Corps troops out of bases, and took over the key city of Kidal. The Africa Corps, which succeeded the Russian Wagner private military company (PMC) previously contracted by the Malians to defend the country, suffered its worst defeat to date. The events of April 25th point to a broader shift in the Sahel region from a state of relative security under the Wagner PMC from late 2022 to mid-2024 to a state of complete insecurity, in which Sahelian states have no reliable security partner to depend on.
Control over the Sahel region, spanning from Mauritania to Chad, long rested in French hands even after the end of colonization, under the Françafrique system. The French controlled Sahelian natural resources, such as Nigerien uranium and Malian gold, and continued their military presence to protect economic interests. The people of the Sahel ultimately came to resent the French and their neocolonial exploitation that left citizens in poverty.
Many in the neglected ethnic Fulani regions turned to jihadist groups like JNIM, while many ethnic Tuaregs in Mali turned to separatist groups. While the French were crucial to fighting off the Malian jihadist insurgency in 2013 with the 18-month-long Opération Serval, their prolonged eight-year Opération Barkhane failed to prevent Islamist resurgencies.
In response to French unpopularity in the region and Russian misinformation campaigns, a wave of coups hit the Sahel between 2022 and 2024, with French-backed governments falling to pro-Russian military juntas in Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. These authoritarian governments controlled by military officers quickly expelled French troops from the region, in a proclaimed rejection of neocolonialism, just to replace them with mercenaries from the Russian Wagner PMC.
Upon their arrival, Wagner saw some initial success in 2023 and early 2024. The 1,600 PMCs in the region were effective in coordinating operations alongside the Malian Armed Forces to retake territory under jihadist or Tuareg control, albeit while committing abhorrent human rights violations. In the fall of 2023, the Russian mercenaries and their Malian counterparts launched an offensive to retake the Tuareg-controlled northeast, culminating in the recapture of the regional capital of Kidal. In February 2024, Wagner and the Malians gained control of the Intahaka mine in the Gao region, which had previously been controlled by JNIM.
For the Malian government, the initial Russian victories vindicated its decision to replace its former French protectors with Russian PMCs. This moment of military dominance marked an invited shift from the passiveness of the French forces to a proactive effort by the Russians to retake captured territory.
However, the tide of the conflict began to turn drastically following the deadly Tuareg ambush on Wagner mercenaries at Tinzaouaten in July 2024, which led to the death or capture of an entire Russian brigade. In the months following, the toll of the Russian engagement in Ukraine became increasingly apparent across the Sahel. That year, following the Prigozhin-led Wagner rebellion, the Wagner PMCs in the region were replaced by the Kremlin-run Africa Corps, which lacked the equipment and troops necessary to defend a landmass the size of Argentina. The Africa Corps began to suffer increasing defeats at the hands of JNIM, marking a shift towards a return to military instability.
Russian power in the region began to collapse, marking the beginning of a period of heightened insecurity in the region not seen since 2012. It is within this context that, in the months leading up to April 2026, JNIM strengthened its grip on certain regions of Mali, notably by blocking the flow of resources in and out of the capital, Bamako. At the same time, without substantial Russian financial support and training, the Sahelien states and their armies had grown weaker. This moment of clear Russian weakness meant that in the event of a large-scale attack, Malian forces would be without a real security partner. This presented the perfect opportunity for JNIM and the FLA to coordinate attacks across Mali, albeit with different long-term goals.
On the morning of April 25th, a JNIM car bomb exploded on the residence of the Malian leader Assimi Goïta, killing the defense minister and wounding the head of intelligence, as JNIM fighters moved into strategic positions around the capital. With the nation focused on the events in Bamako, the FLA took their opportunity to launch surprise attacks in the northeast, forcing the Malians and Russians out of the city of Kidal by the end of the day. On the 26th, the Tuareg FLA attacked Russian garrisons across the northeast, taking the key base at Tessalit. The Russian failure to fulfill their most basic mission, protecting the Malian leaders in Bamako, along with their inability to hold strategic positions in the Northeast, marks the greatest show of Russian weakness in the region to date.
These impressive losses can be attributed to multiple failures by the Russians and the Malians. The Russians lack the troops to defend the country, with only around 300 across the whole of Mali, and the majority concentrated in the gold mining region of the south where the Russians have economic holdings. The Malians lack the modern technology needed to defend their country, as Russian supplies have dwindled as the war in Ukraine absorbs more resources. With such a low Russian troop deployment and a complete lack of Kremlin funding, a complete Africa Corps collapse seems imminent. Without an outside power able to deliver on their security promises, the region’s security will only get increasingly vulnerable.
Unfortunately for the people of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, if the current security status quo remains unchanged, conditions will likely worsen so long as the Russians entrench themselves deeper in Ukraine. In order to achieve long-term stability, the region needs a solution that addresses the immediate security needs and the economic failures that have led to the prevalence of Islamist movements. Without a clear plan to address extreme poverty in predominantly Fulani and Tuareg regions, precarious youth will continue to turn to jihadist groups like JNIM that promise improved conditions.
However, if the Sahelian states are willing to abandon their failing partnership with Russia, they are uniquely positioned to benefit from this moment, in which the U.S. has shown willingness to increase its counterterrorism engagement in West Africa, as exemplified by the joint U.S.-Nigeria operations in early 2026 to fight Boko Haram. The U.S. would be able to provide more precise technology to hit terrorist installations, offer more resources and troop deployments as they are not bogged down by a ground war, and provide more financial support to the failing Sahelian economies.
If the Sahelian leaders are willing to court the Americans once again, they would likely have to offer key rare earth mineral mining contracts to American firms, rather than to the Russian and Chinese firms currently operating in the region. However, a subsequent redeployment of U.S. troops to the region, alongside long-term American investment and mining-related economic development, might be the only way of preventing a jihadist takeover of the Sahel.
The current situation in the Sahel is undoubtedly bleak. The Sahelian states are unable to defend themselves from rebel uprisings, and their foreign Russian protectors are incapable of filling the security gaps. Defeat after defeat on the battlefield has worsened morale in the ranks of the Sahelian armies and made citizens worry for their futures. Nonetheless, if the juntas in power are willing to forgo their failed alliance with Russian mercenaries in favor of new backers, real security support and long-term investment could finally come to the region. Only then can the people of the Sahel hope for a more prosperous future devoid of ultra-poverty and jihadist insurgency.
